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IMMIGRATION LAW—ELIGIBILITY FOR SECTION 212(C) RE
LIEF FROM DEPORTATION: IS IT THE GROUND OR THE OFFENSE,
THE DANCER OR THE DANCE?1
INTRODUCTION
Deportation is the removal of a lawful permanent resident, a
legal noncitizen residing in the United States, from the country.2
The corollary to this immigration procedure is the act of exclusion,3
where a noncitizen is not allowed entry into the United States.4
Currently, two sections of the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952 govern the deportability and excludability of noncitizens.5
1. In his poem, Among School Children, William Butler Yeats asks, “How can we
know the dancer from the dance?” W.B. YEATS, SELECTED POETRY 153 (Timothy
Webb ed., 1991). His question articulates the dilemma when watching a performance:
whether the audience is watching the dancer—the obvious visual entertainment—or,
rather, something below the surface—the dance or the artistic creation. The poet illus
trates just how difficult it is to separate the two. Yeats’s question about creator versus
creation parallels the issue in the current circuit split over eligibility for section 212(c)
relief from deportation. In determining whether a lawful permanent resident is eligible
for section 212(c) relief, most federal circuits focus on the dancer—the language or text
of the deportation grounds—while one circuit emphasizes the dance, the underlying
facts of the offense charged. In this legal dichotomy, it is the dancer that should win our
attention.
2. Congress enacted the term “removal” to refer to both “deportation” and “ex
clusion.” Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
(IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 304(a)(3), 110 Stat. 3009-546, -587 to -597; see 8
U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(2) (2006). For purposes of this Note, both “deportation” and “exclu
sion” will be used.
3. Congress replaced the term “excludable” with “inadmissible” through the en
actment of section 304(a)(3) of IIRIRA. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952
(INA) § 235, 8 U.S.C. § 1225. However, to maintain clarity in this Note, only the term
“exclusion” will be used.
4. “Immigration law features two parallel statutory schemes for regulating the
movements of non-citizens. One involves exclusion, or the process of excluding people
who seek to enter the United States, while the other involves deportation, or the pro
cess of expelling people who are already present in the country.” Leal-Rodriguez v.
INS, 990 F.2d 939, 942 (7th Cir. 1993).
5. See INA § 237(a) (formerly § 241), 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (listing the grounds for
deportation); INA § 212(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (listing the grounds for exclusion). The
Immigration and Nationality Act refers to legal noncitizens as “aliens.” INA
§ 101(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (defining alien as “any person not a citizen or na
tional of the United States”). While the term “noncitizen” is a broader category than
immigrant—it is not exactly accurate since the immigrant is a citizen of some country—
it is preferred in this Note because of the derogatory nature of the word “alien.” See
Hiroshi Motomura, Federalism, International Human Rights, and Immigration Excep
tionalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1361, 1361 & n.1 (1999).
417
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Congress, however, has provided for discretionary relief from
deportation or exclusion for lawful permanent residents6 (LPRs) in
certain circumstances.7 In particular, from 1952 through 1996,
under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA), exclu
sion could be waived pursuant to section 212(c).8 Specifically, sec
tion 212(c) allowed the Attorney General discretion to waive
exclusion for “[a]liens lawfully admitted for permanent residence
who temporarily proceeded abroad voluntarily and not under an
order of deportation, and who are returning to a lawful unrelin
quished domicile of seven consecutive years.”9 Despite appearing
clear on its face as pertaining to only those in exclusion proceed
ings, starting as early as 1940, courts applied section 212(c) not only
to those LPRs as specified in the statute but also to those LPRs
who, but for some mistake of procedure, were placed in deportation
proceedings when they should have been dealt with in exclusion
proceedings.10 Courts found it critical that the LPR in deportation
proceedings had actually departed the country and returned.
6. A lawful permanent resident (LPR) is a noncitizen who has “been lawfully
accorded the privilege of residing permanently in the United States as an immigrant.”
INA § 101(a)(20), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20). The United States Citizenship and Immigra
tion Services (USCIS) defines an LPR as “[a]ny person not a citizen of the United
States who is residing the [sic] in the U.S. under legally recognized and lawfully re
corded permanent residence as an immigrant. Also known as ‘Permanent Resident
Alien,’ ‘Resident Alien Permit Holder,’ and ‘Green Card Holder.’” USCIS, http://
www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis (click on “Resources,” then click on “Glossary” in the
left-hand column and click on the letter “L”). LPR status can be family sponsored,
employment sponsored, or granted to refugees and asylees. 1 CHARLES GORDON ET
AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 1.03[2][e] (rev. ed. 2007). LPRs are af
forded the constitutional protection of procedural due process upon admission into the
United States. Id. § 1.02[3][b]. Nonresident noncitizens, those who are lawfully present
on a temporary basis such as students or temporary workers, are not the subject of this
Note. See id. § 1.03[2][e][iii] (explaining temporary immigrant visas). Neither are “un
documented” or “illegal” immigrants who have entered the country without permission
or overstayed a temporary visa. Id.
7. Between 1952 and 1996 deportation could be waived pursuant to section
244(a)(1). INA § 244(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (1994) (repealed 1996). Section 244
granted relief for anyone who had been physically present in the United States for a
continuous period of at least seven years, who proved that during all of such period he
was and remained a person of good moral character, and who was a person whose
deportation would, in the opinion of the Attorney General, result in extreme hardship.
Id. Current forms of discretionary relief include cancellation of removal, INA § 240A,
8 U.S.C. § 1229b (2006); asylum, INA § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158; non-refoulement, INA
§ 241b(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3); and voluntary departure, INA § 240B, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229c.
8. INA § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994) (repealed 1996).
9. Id.
10. See infra Part II.A.
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After years of granting relief in this manner, the Second Cir
cuit, in Francis v. INS, held, based on equal protection grounds,
that section 212(c) relief was available to those deportees similarly
situated to excludees but who had not departed from and returned
to the United States.11 The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)
subsequently held, in accordance with Francis, that deportable
LPRs who were similarly situated to excludable LPRs must be
treated equally with respect to their applications for section 212(c)
relief.12
About twenty years later, during the 1990s, Congress began to
reshape the focus of immigration law.13 Among the changes, the
legislature both narrowed the class of noncitizens to whom section
212(c) relief applied and broadened the grounds for which non
citizens could be deported.14 Then, in 1996, Congress repealed sec
tion 212(c), replacing it with section 240A(a).15 After some
11. Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268, 269-71 (2d Cir. 1976).
12. In re Silva, 16 I. & N. Dec. 26, 30 (B.I.A. 1976).
13. See Brent Asseff, Note, Reinstatement of Removal and IIRIRA Retroactivity
After Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales: Restoring Section 212(c) Discretion and Fairness to
Immigration Law, 46 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 157, 158 (2007) (“The 1990s was another
period during which society and politics expressed a growing resentment toward immi
grants.”); Anthony Distinti, Note, Gone but Not Forgotten: How Section 212(c) Relief
Continues to Divide Courts Presiding over Indictments for Illegal Reentry, 74 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2809, 2821 (2006) (“The 1990s witnessed a growing societal resentment toward
aliens in the United States. The animosity spiked after the 1993 World Trade Center
bombing and the 1996 Oklahoma City bombing. Congress reacted to public pressure by
passing AEDPA and IIRIRA.”); Jacqueline P. Ulin, Note, A Common Sense Recon
struction of the INA’s Crime-Related Removal System: Eliminating the Caveats from the
Statue of Liberty’s Welcoming Words, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 1549, 1555-56 (2000) (“In the
1990s, Congress continued to target aliens as part of its anti-crime agenda.”). For a
discussion on the relationship between immigration control, crime control, and national
security, see Jennifer M. Chacon, Commentary, Unsecured Borders: Immigration Re
strictions, Crime Control and National Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1827 (2007).
14. See Immigration Act of 1990 (IMMACT), Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 511(a), 104
Stat. 4978, 5052 (amending section 212(c) so that any LPR convicted of an aggravated
felony who had served a term of imprisonment of at least five years was not eligible for
relief); Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No.
104-132, § 440(d), 110 Stat. 1214, 1277 (barring LPRs with aggravated felony convic
tions, drug convictions, certain weapons convictions, among others, from applying for
section 212(c) relief and removing the five-year time served qualification); Illegal Immi
gration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208,
§ 304(b), 110 Stat. 3009-546, -597 (repealing section 212(c) relief altogether); IIRIRA
§ 321, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (redefining and broadening the term “aggravated felony”
to include many new offenses, some of which are misdemeanors and low-level felonies).
15. See INA § 240A, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b. In 1996, IIRIRA created “removal pro
ceedings,” found at INA section 240, 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a), by combining exclusion and
deportation proceedings, formerly found at INA section 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a), and
INA section 241, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a), respectively. See Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88, 96
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uncertainty whether the repeal of section 212(c) applied retroac
tively, the Supreme Court held that section 212(c) relief was not
repealed for certain LPRs in deportation proceedings in progress
before the effective date of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Im
migrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA).16
This Note focuses on how the courts determine whether LPRs,
particularly those subject to deportation under the more recently
defined aggravated felony ground, are eligible for section 212(c) re
lief. With the advent of the equal protection holdings mentioned
earlier, this threshold question of eligibility has become a pivotal
part in the path to section 212(c) relief from deportation.
However, in applying this equal protection framework for eli
gibility, a circuit split has arisen. The split revolves around what it
means for an LPR in deportation proceedings to be similarly situ
ated to an LPR in exclusion proceedings, particularly when deport
able for an aggravated felony. Two approaches have emerged when
asking whether a deportee is similarly situated to an excludee.17
These approaches are similar in nature but differ in the detail.
The majority of courts of appeals follow the comparablegrounds approach, which finds support in federal regulation, admin
istrative and federal case law, and statutory interpretation.18 Under
this approach, courts compare the petitioner’s ground for deporta
tion in section 237(a) (former section 241) to the grounds for exclu
sion listed under section 212(a). If the deportation ground has a

n.6 (2d Cir. 2007). Currently, subsections (a) and (b) of 240A, collectively titled “can
cellation of removal,” allow for the Attorney General to exercise discretion in granting
relief to LPRs in deportation and exclusion proceedings so long as certain requirements
are satisfied. Id. Congress has expressly denied any discretion to cancel the removal of
an aggravated felon. Id.
16. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 315-20 (2001); see infra Part II.C.
17. The author readily acknowledges the development of a three-way split among
the circuits. See Abebe v. Mukasey, 554 F.3d 1203 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (per
curiam). Upon reevaluating its precedent, the Ninth Circuit has taken a different route
altogether by rejecting Francis and eliminating the statutory-counterpart test. Id. at
1207. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit’s third option is to not offer section 212(c) relief
to deportable LPRs who have not left the country. Because this rationale is so distinct
from the issues discussed in this Note, the Abebe decision will be addressed minimally.
See infra Part III.B.3.
18. See infra Parts III.A.1, III.B.1. In 2004, 8 C.F.R. § 1212.3(f)(5) codified the
nomenclature of the comparable-grounds approach as the statutory-counterpart test. 8
C.F.R. § 1212.3(f)(5) (2009). Though it is now properly known as the statutory-coun
terpart test, for purposes of this Note, the terms “comparable grounds” and “statutory
counterpart” will be used interchangeably.
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“counterpart” in the exclusion provision, then the grounds are com
parable and the petitioner is eligible for relief.19
But in 2007, in Blake v. Carbone, the Second Circuit employed
its own offense-specific approach to determine eligibility, focusing
on the underlying offense of an LPR’s deportation charge to answer
whether the LPR was similarly situated to an excludee.20 The court
premised its approach on its previous decision, Francis v. INS, de
scribed above. To satisfy the equal protection concerns of Francis,
the court remanded to determine whether the petitioners’ certain
aggravated felonies could form the basis of the crime involving
moral turpitude (CIMT) ground for exclusion.21
Upon review of both approaches, it is apparent that the Second
Circuit impermissibly expanded the reach of Francis, creating the
unnecessary step of evaluating a petitioner’s underlying offense.
Though compelling, the Second Circuit’s reliance on Francis is
flawed. In evaluating these flaws it becomes clear that the majority
approach is best and, in fact, the concern for equal protection is
unfounded.
In contrast, the comparable-grounds approach continues to sat
isfactorily address the question of section 212(c) eligibility. This
majority approach serves as an effective, consistent, and fair way to
determine section 212(c) eligibility. This Note contends that, ab
sent congressional action, the majority of courts of appeals follow
the proper approach in determining whether an LPR is eligible for
section 212(c) relief from deportation. The comparable-grounds
approach, codified at 8 C.F.R. § 1212.3(f)(5) as the statutory-coun
terpart rule, is preferred because it comports with legislative intent
and administrative policy. Moreover, it promotes uniformity and
avoids adding further confusion to the section 212(c) eligibility
analysis.
Part I of this Note provides a short overview of removal. Part
II discusses the history of the section 212(c) waiver. Part III exam
ines the circuit split and briefly addresses a recent Ninth Circuit
decision, which departs from both approaches at issue in this Note.
19. See, e.g., In re Blake, 23 I. & N. Dec. 722, 726 (B.I.A. 2005) (“[W]hether the
deportation ground under which the [LPR] has been adjudged deportable has a statu
tory counterpart among the exclusion grounds waivable by section 212(c).” (quoting In
re Jimenez-Santillano, 21 I. & N. Dec. 567, 574 (B.I.A. 1996)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)), vacated sub nom. Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88.
20. 489 F.3d 88, 103.
21. Id. at 104. The court described its decision as merely “confined to the equal
protection principle articulated in Francis.” Id.
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Lastly, Part IV puts forth the argument that the comparablegrounds approach properly applies the constitutional guarantee of
equal protection per Francis, promotes the policies of uniformity
and efficiency, and upholds long-standing administrative and judi
cial precedent, therefore making it the correct approach for deter
mining section 212(c) eligibility.
I. REMOVAL
A. Congressional Plenary Power
Although the United States Constitution does not explicitly
grant Congress authority over immigration, it does grant Congress
broad powers in the immigration context. The main sources of fed
eral power over immigration include the Naturalization Clause,22
the Migration or Importation Clause,23 and the War Powers
Clause.24 Congress is also vested with the power to control immi
gration via the intrinsic right of a sovereign to control its borders.25
It is well understood that Congress holds the exclusive authority to
design immigration policy.26
Indeed, the Supreme Court stated that Congress’s authority to
prescribe grounds for expelling resident aliens is “plenary” and
stated that a resident’s stay in this country is one of “permission and
tolerance.”27 Thus, the congressional right to deport noncitizens “is
as absolute and unqualified as the right to prohibit and prevent
22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (vesting in Congress the power “[t]o establish an
uniform rule of naturalization”).
23. Id. § 9, cl. 1 (pertaining to limits on “[t]he migration and importation of such
persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit”).
24. Id. § 8, cl. 11 (granting Congress the power to declare war).
25. See Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 39 (1924) (“The right to expel aliens is a
sovereign power, necessary to the safety of the country, and only limited by treaty obli
gations in respect thereto entered into with other governments.”); Fong Yue Ting v.
United States, 149 U.S. 698, 711 (1893) (“The right to exclude or to expel all aliens [is]
. . . an inherent and inalienable right of every sovereign and independent nation . . . .”);
Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 604-07
(1889) (stating that Congress has absolute power to exclude legal aliens when required
by public interest to protect the country’s security and autonomy); see also 1 GORDON
ET AL., supra note 6, § 1.03[4][a].
26. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954) (stating that Congress’s control over
immigration policies “has become about as firmly imbedded in the legislative and judi
cial tissues of our body politic as any aspect of our government”).
27. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 586-87 (1952); see Kleindienst v.
Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766 (1972); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 222 (1961); see
also McJunkin v. INS, 579 F.2d 533, 536 (9th Cir. 1978) (“Congress possesses plenary
power over immigration and may impose conditions upon the privilege of remaining in
this country which could not be imposed upon citizens.” (citation omitted)).

R
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their entrance.”28 By 1893, the Supreme Court made clear that,
from a policy perspective, deportation was justified “simply because
[the LPR’s] presence is deemed inconsistent with the public wel
fare, and without any punishment being imposed or contemplated,
either under the laws of the country out of which he is sent or under
those of the country to which he is taken.”29
B. Short History of Removal
The Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 provided for the deporta
tion of noncitizens, giving the President the power to deport (1)
resident aliens who maintained citizenship of a country at war with
the United States (enemy aliens),30 (2) any alien whom the Presi
dent considered a threat to the peace and safety of the country,31
and (3) any alien in prison.32 Besides the Alien and Sedition Acts,
28. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 713-14; see Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel.
Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953) (stating that the power to exclude or deport aliens is
“largely immune from judicial control”); The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 607
09 (explaining the sovereign power of the government to exclude people from the
United States).
29. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 709. Some scholars argue that deportation is in
fact punishment for lawful permanent residents akin to that of the penal system. See
Peter L. Markowitz, Straddling the Criminal-Civil Divide: A Bifurcated Approach to
Understanding the Nature of Immigration Removal Proceedings, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 289 (2008); Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sov
ereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367 (2006); Michelle Rae Pinzon, Note, Was the Su
preme Court Right? A Closer Look at the True Nature of Removal Proceedings in the
21st Century, 16 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 29 (2003); see also Peter H. Schuck, The Transfor
mation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 24-27 (1984). Though not discussed
in this Note, it is helpful to understand the opposing arguments in this debate. The civil
and administrative argument states that because the “deportee is not being indicted,
tried, and sentenced for [a] crime . . . expulsion is simply a protective measure to rid the
United States of aliens deemed undesirable, and that in any event the deportee is
merely being sent back to his country of origin and allegiance.” 6 GORDON ET AL.,
supra note 6, § 71.01[4][a]–[c]. The criminal argument contends that so long as the
deportee is not a recent arrival to the country, then the no-punishment argument lacks
standing because the alien has likely established roots in the United States for many
years. Id.; see, e.g., Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 147 (1945) (“[D]eportation may
deprive the non-citizen ‘of all that makes life worth living.’” (quoting Ng Fung Ho v.
White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922))); Scheidemann v. INS, 83 F.3d 1517, 1527 (3d Cir.
1996) (Sarokin, J., concurring) (“The legal fiction that deportation following a criminal
conviction is not punishment is difficult to reconcile with reality, especially in the con
text of [longtime LPRs].”). Nevertheless, under current law deportation is considered
civil and administrative, not criminal. See 6 GORDON ET AL., supra note 6, § 71.01[4][a].
30. Alien Enemy Act of July 6, 1798, ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577, 577-78 (codified at 50
U.S.C. §§ 21-24 (2006)).
31. Alien Friends Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570-72 (expired 1800).
32. Id.; see Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (expired 1801); Act of June 18,
1798, ch. 54, 1 Stat. 566 (repealed 1802).
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the nation’s first one hundred years consisted of unrestricted immi
gration.33 The country’s need for labor as a developing nation was
its main purpose behind this open-door policy.34 Eventually, in
1875, Congress did invoke its power over immigration by passing its
first restrictive statute barring the admission of convicts and
prostitutes.35
In 1882, Congress enacted laws aimed at immigrants from
China. The Chinese Exclusion Acts restricted immigration of Chi
nese laborers for ten years and the admittance of Chinese residents
to citizenship.36 In 1891, Congress added, in conjunction with its
exclusion laws, a deportation statute limited to “any alien who shall
come into the United States in violation of law.”37 Then in 1907,
Congress passed a deportation statute with respect to a noncitizen’s
conduct after she had made a lawful entry into the United States.38
In 1917, Congress revised and passed a new set of immigration laws
and in the 1920s created further restrictions.39 The laws remained
the same until the enactment of the INA in 1952.40
C. Grounds for Removal
The INA specifies the grounds under which an LPR may be
excluded or deported.41 If a noncitizen is seeking entry to the
United States and falls under a provision of section 212(a), then the
noncitizen is “ineligible to be admitted to the United States.”42
33. 1 GORDON ET AL., supra note 6, § 2.02[1].
34. Id.
35. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 141, § 5, 18 Stat. 477, 477-78.
36. Chinese Exclusion Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58, repealed by Chi
nese Exclusion Repeal Act of 1943, ch. 344, 57 Stat. 600.
37. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551, § 11, 26 Stat. 1084, 1086.
38. Act of Feb. 20, 1907, ch. 1134, § 3, 34 Stat. 898, 900 (making deportable any
noncitizen who was a prostitute “at any time within three years after she shall have
entered the United States”).
39. See Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874; see, e.g., Act of May 26, 1924, ch.
190, § 11, 43 Stat. 153, 159-160.
40. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537 (2006)).
41. INA § 212(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (grounds for exclusion); INA § 237(a), 8
U.S.C. § 1227(a) (grounds for deportation). While the grounds for exclusion and de
portation are enumerated separately, because Congress recently adopted the term “re
moval” to describe both exclusion and deportation, both sets of grounds are now
generally referred to as “grounds for removal.” See supra note 2. For purposes of this
Note, these grounds will be referred to separately.
42. See INA § 212(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a). Currently there are forty-six grounds
for exclusion. Id. The following three categories include these grounds: (1) Health and
Related Grounds, (2) Criminal and Related Grounds (most relevant to this Note), and
(3) Security and Related Grounds. INA § 212(a)(1)–(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)-(3).
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However, after an initial lawful admission, if an LPR residing in the
United States commits an act provided for in section 237(a), then
the LPR is subject to deportation.43 Some of the exclusionary and
deportation categories overlap; however, certain acts amount only
to grounds for deportation, while others only exclusion.44
II.

HISTORY

OF

SECTION 212(C) RELIEF

A. The Precursor to Section 212(c) Relief: 1917
The first form of discretionary relief is found in the seventh
proviso of section 3 of the Immigration Act of 1917.45 Section 3 of
the Act focused on the exclusion of noncitizens only.46 However,
the seventh proviso allowed the Secretary of Labor47 to admit cer
tain noncitizens in exclusion proceedings to the United States.48
These noncitizens were those returning to their permanent U.S. res
idence of at least seven consecutive years after a temporary trip
abroad.49
In 1940, in In re L—, upon certification from the BIA, the At
torney General first expanded the applicability of the seventh pro
viso to deportation proceedings.50 In weighing the equitable
concerns for Mr. L—, a noncitizen from Yugoslavia, the Attorney
43. See INA § 237(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a). Congress has enumerated thirty-three
grounds for deportation, which are distributed among six categories: (1) Inadmissible at
Time of Entry or of Adjustment of Status or Violates Status, (2) Failure to Register and
Falsification of Documents, (3) Security and Related Grounds, (4) Public Charge
Grounds, (5) Unlawful Voting, and (6) Criminal Offenses. INA § 237(a)(1)–(6), 8
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)-(6).
44. While the grounds in each provision may be similar, they are not identical.
Both contain criminal and noncriminal bases for removal, but the consequences of a
criminal offense may be more serious in both the deportation proceedings itself and
beyond. See 6 GORDON ET AL., supra note 6, § 71.01[4][c].
45. Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, § 3, 39 Stat. 874, 875-78.
46. Id.
47. The Secretary of Labor originally held the role of overseeing immigration
matters. The shift in administration to the Attorney General was made for national
security reasons. See Vernon M. Briggs, Jr., The Administration of U.S. Immigration
Policy: Time for Another Change, 4 SOC. CONT. 192, 195 (1994), available at http://www.
thesocialcontract.com/pdf/four-three/briggs.pdf (discussing the history of the adminis
tration of U.S. immigration policy).
48. Immigration Act of 1917 § 3 (“[A]liens returning after a temporary absence
to an unrelinquished United States domicile of seven consecutive years may be admit
ted in the discretion of the Secretary of Labor, and under such conditions as he may
prescribe . . . .”).
49. Id.
50. In re L—, 1 I. & N. Dec. 1 (B.I.A. 1940).
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General used his discretion nunc pro tunc51 and granted relief.52
Mr. L— was convicted of a CIMT (larceny), which, under the law
at that time, made him excludable but not deportable.53 He later
temporarily traveled abroad to visit family; upon return, immigra
tion officers overlooked Mr. L—’s excludability and admitted him
into the country.54 A few months later, Mr. L— was placed in de
portation proceedings because of his earlier CIMT conviction.55
Under this scheme, Mr. L— technically did not have discretionary
relief available to him because the seventh proviso only applied to
those in exclusionary proceedings.56 However, the Attorney Gen
eral determined that relief should be available to Mr. L— because
it would have been available to him had he been properly put in
exclusionary proceedings when he returned to the United States.57
The Attorney General recognized that to deny Mr. L— relief from
deportation would have been to deny him solely on a technicality,
and “[n]o policy of Congress could possibly be served by such irra
tional result.”58 Critical to his analysis, the Attorney General held
that sections 3 and 19 (the grounds for exclusion and deportation,
respectively) “must be read together.”59 In essence, he compared
both grounds and found that because of their similarity, a “correc
tive exercise” of authority under the seventh proviso was proper.60
51. “Nunc pro tunc relief is a legal fiction that corrects the erroneous denial of
relief in the past by providing such relief now.” Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88, 94 n.5
(2d Cir. 2007) (citing Edwards v. INS, 393 F.3d 299, 308 (2d Cir. 2004)). Black’s Law
Dictionary defines nunc pro tunc as “[h]aving retroactive legal effect through a court’s
inherent power.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1174 (9th ed. 2009). The concept can be
thought of as “now for then.” Id. See generally Tammy W. Hui, Note, The Case for
Nunc Pro Tunc Adjudication of Section 212(c) Applications Wrongfully Denied Based
on an Erroneous Legal Interpretation, 30 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 589 (2008).
52. In re L—, 1 I. & N. Dec. at 5-6.
53. Id. at 1-3. Mr. L— was excludable under section 3 of the Immigration Act of
1917, which excluded “persons who have been convicted of . . . a felony or other crime
or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude.” Immigration Act of 1917 § 3.
54. In re L—, 1 I. & N. Dec. at 2.
55. Id. at 1-2. Mr. L— was deportable under section 19 of the Immigration Act
of 1917 as a noncitizen “convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude prior to entry
into the United States.” Id. at 4.
56. Id. at 5.
57. Id. at 5-6.
58. Id. at 5.
59. Id. at 6.
60. Id.; see In re A—, 2 I. & N. Dec. 459, 462-63 (B.I.A. 1946) (granting seventh
proviso relief where a close connection existed between the ground for deportation and
corresponding ground for exclusion thereby allowing petitioner to depart the United
States and return so exclusion could be waived); cf. In re M—, 5 I. & N. Dec. 642, 647
(B.I.A. 1954) (denying section 212(c) relief from deportation for entry without inspec
tion because of a lack of a corresponding ground of exclusion); In re T—, 5 I. & N. Dec.
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By granting what “amount[ed] to little more than a correction of a
record of entry,” the Attorney General made the landmark decision
to provide relief from deportation via the seventh proviso.61
B. Section 212(c): 1952–1976
In 1952, Congress compiled all the immigration laws from 1798
through the 1920s into the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952.62 With the enactment of the INA, what was once the seventh
proviso became section 212(c).63 Like its predecessor, section
212(c) only governed exclusionary proceedings.64 Yet the BIA con
tinued with its pre-1952 practice of extending relief to the deporta
tion context in certain circumstances.65
In 1956, in In re G—A—, the BIA first granted section 212(c)
relief to a Mexican LPR who pled guilty to an excludable offense,
departed temporarily, returned to the United States, and was then
placed in deportation proceedings.66 Based on In re L—, the BIA
allowed the LPR to apply for section 212(c) relief nunc pro tunc.67
The BIA found the LPR eligible, reasoning that because the LPR
would have been eligible for section 212(c) relief had he been prop
erly placed in exclusionary proceedings upon reentry, he should be
eligible for such relief in later deportation proceedings regardless of
the statute’s plain language.68 For about the next twenty years the
389, 390 (B.I.A. 1953) (denying section 212(c) relief from deportation for immigration
document fraud because of a lack of a corresponding ground of exclusion).
61. In re L—, 1 I. & N. Dec. at 6.
62. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537 (2006)).
63. INA § 212(c), 66 Stat. at 187 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994)), repealed
by Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, div. C, § 304(b), 110 Stat. 3009-546, -597; see Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268, 270
71 (2d Cir. 1976).
64. INA § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. §1182(c) (1994) (repealed 1996) (providing that relief
is available to those LPRs “not under an order of deportation”).
65. See, e.g., In re G—A—, 7 I. & N. Dec. 274, 276 (1956); In re F—, 6 I. & N.
Dec. 537, 538-39 (B.I.A. 1955); In re S—, 6 I. & N. Dec. 392, 393 (B.I.A. 1954; Att’y
Gen. 1955).
66. In re G—A—, 7 I. & N. Dec. at 274-75.
67. Id. at 276. Interestingly, despite a seeming requirement for travel abroad, in
In re Smith, section 212(c) relief was extended to deportation proceedings for an LPR
requesting adjustment of status. 11 I. & N. Dec. 325, 327 (1965). The court reasoned
that there was “no valid reason for denying him the benefits of section 212(c) on the
technical ground that he is not returning to the United States after a voluntary depar
ture.” Id.
68. See In re G—A—, 7 I. & N. Dec. at 276; see also Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d
88, 94 (2d Cir. 2007) (“According to the BIA, a [section] 212(c) waiver should be availa
ble to lawful permanent residents who commit an excludable offense in the United
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availability of section 212(c) discretionary relief was limited to
those LPRs, like Mr. L— and Mr. G—A—, who had actually de
parted, returned to the country, and then faced deportation.69 For
example, in In re Arias-Uribe, the BIA held that the nunc pro tunc
discretion afforded in In re L— did not apply because the LPR had
never left the country and therefore would never have been subject
to exclusionary proceedings.70 The situation of an error in the re
cord of entry discussed in In re L— had not occurred. While ac
knowledging that the scope of section 212(c) had already been
extended beyond its plain meaning, the BIA did not want to go
further and grant relief to an LPR who had not physically left the
United States.71 To support this conclusion, the BIA referenced a
change in language from the seventh proviso to section 212(c) that
illustrated Congress’s intent to require an actual departure and re
turn to the United States.72
In 1976, however, the Second Circuit effectively eliminated this
physical-departure limitation on section 212(c) eligibility.73 In
Francis v. INS, the court expanded the reach of section 212(c) to
certain noncitizens who had not traveled outside the United
States.74 Francis permanently resided in the United States for ten
years but was found deportable after being convicted of a drug
charge.75 He sought section 212(c) relief, the BIA denied his appli
cation, and he appealed to the Second Circuit.76 Francis argued
that section 212(c), as applied by the BIA, created two identical
classes of aliens, except that, in one class, members departed and
returned to the United States at some point after they became de
portable while members in another class never left.77 This applica
tion, he argued, deprived him of his constitutional right to equal
States, depart and return to the United States after commission of the offense, have not
been put in exclusion proceedings upon return, but later end up in deportation
proceedings.”).
69. See, e.g., In re Arias-Uribe, 13 I. & N. Dec. 696, 698 (B.I.A. 1971), aff’d sub
nom. Arias-Uribe v. INS, 466 F.2d 1198 (9th Cir. 1972) (per curiam).
70. Id. at 697-98.
71. Id. at 698.
72. Id. at 700. The language changed from requiring the LPR to have “return[ed]
after a temporary absence” to requiring the LPR to have “temporarily proceed[ed]
abroad voluntarily and not under an order of deportation.” Id. at 699 & n.2.
73. Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 1976).
74. See id.
75. Id. at 269.
76. Id. at 270.
77. Id. at 272.
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protection of the laws.78 The Second Circuit agreed, concluding
that the distinction was not rationally related to any legitimate pur
pose of the statute.79
The court further stated that the statute, as applied, violated
the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment by limit
ing discretion to those who temporarily traveled abroad and not
considering those similarly situated but who had not left the coun
try.80 “Fundamental fairness dictates that permanent resident
aliens who are in like circumstances, but for irrelevant and fortui
tous factors, be treated in a like manner.”81 Rather than strike the
statute, the Second Circuit further extended the reach of section
212(c) by making relief from deportation “available to deportable
[LPRs] who differ[ ] from excludable [LPRs] only in terms of a re
cent departure from the country.”82
A few months later, in In re Silva, the BIA adopted the Francis
holding.83 As a result, section 212(c) relief became available to
those in deportation proceedings who had never traveled outside
78. Id.
79. Id. at 272-73. The Second Circuit applied the “minimal scrutiny test” requir
ing that “distinctions between different classes of persons ‘must be reasonable, not arbi
trary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial
relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall
be treated alike.’” Id. at 272 (quoting Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14 (1975)). Note
that “all individuals in the United States—citizens and aliens alike—are protected by
the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. . . . However, [f]ederal authority in the
areas of immigration and naturalization is plenary. Accordingly, federal classifications
based on alienage are subject to relaxed scrutiny.” Garberding v. INS, 30 F.3d 1187,
1190 (9th Cir. 1994) (alteration in original) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted).
80. See Francis, 532 F.2d at 272 n.5, 272-73. The court reasoned that “an alien
whose ties with this country are so strong that he has never departed after his initial
entry should receive at least as much consideration as an individual who may leave and
return from time to time.” Id.; see also Elwin Griffith, The Road Between the Section
212(c) Waiver and Cancellation of Removal Under Section 240A of the Immigration and
Nationality Act—The Impact of the 1996 Reform Legislation, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 65,
94 n.211 (1997) (explaining that there is no specific Equal Protection Clause in the Fifth
Amendment, but it does forbid discrimination that violates due process, thereby creat
ing the connection between the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
81. Francis, 532 F.2d at 273. The court further stated, “We do not dispute the
power of the Congress to create different standards of admission and deportation for
different groups of aliens. However, . . . individuals within a particular group may not
be subjected to disparate treatment on criteria wholly unrelated to any legitimate gov
ernmental interest.” Id. (footnote omitted).
82. See Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88, 95 (2d Cir. 2007).
83. In re Silva, 16 I. & N. Dec. 26, 30 (B.I.A. 1976).

\\server05\productn\W\WNE\32-2\WNE205.txt

430

unknown

Seq: 14

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

24-MAY-10

16:05

[Vol. 32:417

the United States.84 Immigration courts were thus tasked with con
sidering the merits of petitions for relief from deportees similarly
situated to excludees.85
With the equal protection framework in place, it became diffi
cult to determine whether a deportable LPR was similarly situated
to an excludable LPR.86 As a result, courts found it necessary to
evaluate the grounds for deportation and exclusion; the analysis re
quired a determination that they be comparable and that the
ground of deportation could be found in the grounds for exclu
sion.87 The BIA settled on the comparable-grounds approach to
guide immigration judges in their equal protection determination.88
By comparing the petitioner’s ground of deportation to the enu
merated grounds of exclusion, the BIA was better able to discern
which petitioners met the equal protection mandate set out in Fran
cis and Silva.89
Towards the end of this time period, Congress established the
aggravated felony ground of deportation, which at that point in
cluded only murder, drug trafficking, and weapons trafficking.90
The number of aggravated felony grounds increased during the rush
of legislation in the 1990s.91 Importantly, as the number and types
increased, the grounds of exclusion did not. Thus, for determining
84. Id. (“In light of the constitutional requirements of due process and equal pro
tection of the law, it is our position that no distinction shall be made between perma
nent resident aliens who temporarily proceed abroad and non-departing permanent
resident aliens.”).
85. See id.
86. Blake, 489 F.3d at 95.
87. See, e.g., In re Wadud, 19 I. & N. Dec. 182, 184 (B.I.A. 1984); In re Granados,
16 I. & N. Dec. 726, 728 (B.I.A. 1979), abrogated by In re Wadud, 19 I. & N. Dec. 182.
88. Blake, 489 F.3d at 95; see Abebe v. Gonzales, 493 F.3d 1092, 1099 (9th Cir.
2007), reh’g en banc sub nom. Abebe v. Mukasey, 554 F.3d 1203 (9th Cir. 2009) (per
curiam) (“[T]he BIA has resisted further departures from the statutory text and consist
ently held that relief is available only for aliens facing deportation on a ground with
some tight connection to a ground of excludability that could have been waived under
§ 212(c) had the alien traveled abroad.”).
89. See infra Part III.A for a more detailed look at how the comparable-grounds
test evolved and changed in light of the aggravated felony ground of deportation.
90. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7342, 102 Stat. 4181,
4469 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2006)); see Abebe, 493 F.3d at
1099-1100 n.10 (“The ‘aggravated felony’ deportation ground was created by the AntiDrug Abuse Act of 1988 (‘ADAA’) and was defined narrowly to include murder, drug
trafficking, and weapons trafficking. Since that time, the number of offenses classified
as aggravated felonies has exploded.” (citations omitted)).
91. See infra notes 96, 101, and accompanying text.
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section 212(c) eligibility, a discrepancy was created that the courts
had to reconcile in their analyses.92
C. Section 212(c): 1990–2004
The 1990s ushered in a new era of immigration law. A large
policy shift occurred in an attempt to rid the country of criminal
noncitizens and threats of terrorism.93 As part of that shift, Con
gress enacted various amendments limiting the reach of section
212(c) and ultimately repealing it in total.94 First, in 1990, the Im
migration Act of 1990 (IMMACT) removed eligibility for section
212(c) relief for any noncitizen convicted of an aggravated felony
who served five years or more in prison.95 Next, in 1996, the Anti
terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) elimi
nated eligibility for section 212(c) relief for any LPR rendered
deportable because of an aggravated felony conviction regardless of
length of the sentence.96 AEDPA also expanded the definition of
aggravated felony to include many more criminal offenses, which
further narrowed eligibility for 212(c) relief.97
Several months later, Congress passed IIRIRA, which included
an amendment that ended section 212(c) relief for proceedings
commenced on or after April 1, 1997.98 Another amendment en
acted the new form of discretionary relief titled “cancellation of re
moval,” which has a much narrower framework for eligibility than
92. See INA § 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (defining aggravated felonies).
In Blake v. Carbone, the petitioners made multiple arguments including the argument
that “their aggravated felony ground of deportation has a counterpart in the ground of
exclusion for crimes of moral turpitude because all aggravated felonies are crimes of
mortal turpitude, or, in the alternative, their individual aggravated felonies could form
the basis of a ground of exclusion.” Blake, 489 F.3d at 100. The Second Circuit agreed
with their alternative argument. Id. at 104. For informational purposes, the present
removal provision states that “[a]ny alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at
any time after admission is” removable. INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Conviction is defined at INA § 101(a)(48), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(48)(A).
93. See supra note 13.
94. Blake, 489 F.3d at 96.
95. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 101-649, § 511, 104 Stat. 4978, 5052.
96. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
§ 440(d), 110 Stat. 1214, 1277. Drug convictions, multiple CIMTs, certain weapon
charges, and national security violations were also included in this broader list of of
fenses. Id.
97. 6 GORDON ET AL., supra note 6, § 74.04(i)(b).
98. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-208, div. C, §§ 304(b), 309(a), 110 Stat. 3009-546, -597, -626.
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did section 212(c).99 For example, LPRs convicted of an aggravated
felony are ineligible for cancellation of removal.100 And, like
AEDPA, IIRIRA redefined “aggravated felony” by adding more
offenses to the list.101 Moreover, Congress made this new defini
tion retroactive so that it applied to crimes committed both before
and after the effective date of IIRIRA.102
IIRIRA, however, was unclear regarding the retroactive effect
of the repeal of section 212(c).103 Accordingly, the BIA and federal
courts had room for interpretation.104 In 1997, in In re Soriano, the
99. IIRIRA sec. 304(a)(3), § 240A(a), 110 Stat. at 3009-594 (codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229b (2006)); see Paul B. Hunker III, Cancellation of Removal or Cancellation of
Relief?—The 1996 IIRIRA Amendments: A Review and Critique of Section 240A(a) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act, 15 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 2 (2000).
100. INA § 240A(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3).
101. INA § 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (as amended by IIRIRA § 321(a)).
“[T]he definition of what constitutes an aggravated felony has steadily grown and now
includes conduct that is neither ‘aggravated’ nor ‘felonious,’ as those words are com
monly understood. . . . [S]everal misdemeanors, including shoplifting and simple bat
tery, are now considered aggravated felonies for purposes of the INA.” William J.
Johnson, Note, When Misdemeanors Are Felonies: The Aggravated Felony of Sexual
Abuse of a Minor, 52 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 419, 424 (2007-2008) (footnote omitted).
Much scholarship has been published regarding the various aggravated felony
grounds and the issues related to them. See, e.g., Terry Coonan, Dolphins Caught in
Congressional Fishnets—Immigration Law’s New Aggravated Felons, 12 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 589 (1998); Melissa Cook, Note, Banished for Minor Crimes: The Aggravated Fel
ony Provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act as a Human Rights Violation, 23
B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 293 (2003); Natalie Liem, Note, Mean What You Say, Say What
You Mean: Defining the Aggravated Felony Deportation Grounds to Target More than
Aggravated Felons, 59 FLA. L. REV. 1071 (2007); Valerie Neal, Note, Slings and Arrows
of Outrageous Fortune: The Deportation of “Aggravated Felons,” 36 VAND. J. TRANS
NAT’L L. 1619 (2003); Brent K. Newcomb, Comment, Immigration Law and the Crimi
nal Alien: A Comparison of Policies for Arbitrary Deportations of Legal Permanent
Residents Convicted of Aggravated Felonies, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 697 (1998); Sara A. Rod
riguez, Note, Exile and the Not-So-Lawful Permanent Resident: Does International Law
Require a Humanitarian Waiver of Deportation for the Non-Citizen Convicted of Certain
Crimes?, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 483 (2006).
102. IIRIRA § 321(b). Today, an LPR may be subject to
deportation proceedings for an offense he or she committed 25 years ago, even
if the crime was not then defined as an aggravated felony (and therefore may
not have been a deportable offense), and the immigrant at that time was pun
ished in the criminal law system. Furthermore, immigrants who 25 years ago
committed aggravated felonies now have no relief from deportation.
American Immigration Lawyers Association, AILA InfoNet, Press Room, Press Re
leases and Statements, 1998-1994, IIRAIRA Reform, http://www.aila.org/Content/
default.aspx?docid=3545 (last visited Apr. 28, 2010).
103. See IIRIRA § 321(c) (providing that its amendments did not apply to depor
tation proceedings in progress prior to the date of enactment).
104. See, e.g., St. Cyr v. INS, 229 F.3d 406, 420 (2d Cir. 2000), aff’d, 533 U.S. 289
(2001); In re Soriano, 21 I. & N. Dec. 516, 528-30 (B.I.A. 1996), disapproved by 21 I. &
N. Dec. 533 (Att’y Gen. 1997); In re Yeung, 21 I. & N. Dec. 610, 614 (B.I.A. 1996).
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Attorney General held that the repeal of section 212(c) operated
retroactively.105 Several courts of appeals followed suit, while
others did not.106 Eventually the issue came to the Supreme Court.
In 2001, the Supreme Court addressed this question of retroac
tive effect in its watershed decision INS v. St. Cyr.107 The Court
held that the IIRIRA amendments did not retroactively eliminate
212(c) relief and thus overturned In re Soriano.108 Relief would
remain available to those “whose convictions were obtained
through plea agreements and who, notwithstanding those convic
tions, would have been eligible for [section] 212(c) relief at the time
of their plea under the law then in effect.”109 The Court suggested
that IIRIRA had an unlawful retroactive effect on the due process
rights of an LPR who relied on the availability of the section 212(c)
waiver by pleading guilty to aggravated felonies.110 Moreover, the
basic notion of fairness required that petitioners have notice of
what the law is so their decisions could be made accordingly.111
And in deciding whether Congress meant for a statute to apply ret
roactively, the language must clearly state its intention so there can
be only one meaning.112
Three years later, in response to St. Cyr, the Department of
Homeland Security promulgated a rule to codify the Supreme
Court’s holding.113 The rule provided for the availability of section
212(c) waivers to LPRs with a criminal conviction entered before
105. In re Soriano, 21 I. & N. Dec. 533 (Att’y Gen. 1997).
106. Compare Requena-Rodriguez v. Pasquarell, 190 F.3d 299, 306-08 (5th Cir.
1999) (finding that repeal of section 212(c) operated retroactively), and De Sousa v.
Reno, 190 F.3d 175, 186-87 (3d Cir. 1999) (same), with Henderson v. INS, 157 F.3d 106,
130 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding that repeal of section 212(c) did not operate retroactively),
and Goncalves v. Reno, 144 F.3d 110, 133-34 (1st Cir. 1998) (same).
107. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289. See generally Brent S. Wible, The Strange After
life of Section 212(c) Relief: Collateral Attacks on Deportation Orders in Prosecutions
for Illegal Reentry After St. Cyr, 19 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 455 (2005); Anjali Parekh
Prakash, Note, Changing the Rules: Arguing Against Retroactive Application of Depor
tation Statutes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1420 (1997); Vashti D. Van Wyke, Comment, Retroac
tivity and Immigrant Crimes Since St. Cyr: Emerging Signs of Judicial Restraint, 154 U.
PA. L. REV. 741 (2006).
108. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 326.
109. Id. Though not directly at issue in the Court’s opinion, the holding garnered
the same result with respect to AEDPA. See, e.g., Attwood v. Ashcroft, 260 F.3d 1, 3
(1st Cir. 2001).
110. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 315, 325.
111. Id. at 316.
112. Id. at 317.
113. Section 212(c) Relief for Aliens with Certain Criminal Convictions Before
April 1, 1997, 69 Fed. Reg. 57,826 (Sept. 28, 2004) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 1003, 1212,
and 1240).
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April 1, 1997.114 After the notice and comment period, the final
rule also included a codification of the comparable-grounds ap
proach.115 Specifically, the final rule provided that section 212(c)
relief is not available when an LPR “is deportable under former
section 241 of the Act or removable under section 237 of the Act on
a ground which does not have a statutory counterpart in section 212
of the Act.”116 Part III.A.2 discusses the statutory-counterpart rule
further.
III. DETERMINING ELIGIBILITY

FOR

SECTION 212(C) RELIEF

A. Evolution of the Comparable-Grounds Approach
The exact time when the BIA first employed the comparablegrounds approach is debatable.117 This Part focuses on three pri
mary cases that formed the basis of the comparable-grounds ap
proach in light of Francis. In re Wadud, In re Hernandez-Casillas,
and In re Meza each held that eligibility for section 212(c) relief
applies only to those petitioners found deportable with a comparaIn March 2003, Congress abolished the agency known as the Immigration and Nat
uralization Service (INS) and created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 101, 116 Stat. 2135, 2142. The
Homeland Security Act of 2002 reorganized the regulation of immigration laws into
three new bureaus under the DHS: The Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Ser
vices (BCIS or USCIS), the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (BICE
or ICE), and the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (BCBP). Id. The Execu
tive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR), however, operates within the Department
of Justice (DOJ) and continues to house the Immigration Court and the Board of Immi
gration Appeals (BIA). Id.
114. See Section 212(c) Relief for Aliens with Certain Criminal Convictions
Before April 1, 1997, 69 Fed. Reg. at 57,826; see also Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88, 97
(2d Cir. 2007) (discussing the promulgation).
115. Section 212(c) Relief for Aliens with Certain Criminal Convictions Before
April 1, 1997, 69 Fed. Reg. at 57,832 (DHS agreeing that to be eligible for section 212(c)
relief, an LPR must be “deportable or removable on a ground that has a corresponding
ground of exclusion or inadmissibility” (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)).
116. 8 C.F.R. § 1212.3(f)(5) (2009) (emphasis added).
117. Compare Valere v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 757, 761 (7th Cir. 2007) (“The ‘statu
tory counterpart’ rule for deportees seeking to invoke § 212(c) appears in the case law
as far back as the late 1970s . . . .”), and Vo v. Gonzales, 482 F.3d 363, 367 (5th Cir.
2007) (“Since at least 1979, the BIA has held that § 212(c) relief is available only to
waive charges of deportability for which there is a comparable ground of inadmissibil
ity.”), with In re M—, 5 I. & N. Dec. 642, 647 (B.I.A. 1954), and Sarah Koteen Barr, C
Is for Confusion: The Tortuous Path of Section 212(c) Relief in the Deportation Context,
12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 725, 735 (2008) (“Matter of T—, decided in 1953, appears
to be the first explicit use of a comparable-grounds approach by the BIA.”).
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ble ground of exclusion.118 These cases foreshadowed the eventual
codification of the comparable-grounds approach as the statutorycounterpart rule.
1. BIA Comparable-Grounds Jurisprudence
As stated earlier, in In re Silva, the BIA acknowledged that the
Constitution demands that similarly situated noncitizens be treated
equally in certain situations.119 That same year, however, the BIA
made it clear that Francis only expanded the class of noncitizens to
which section 212(c) applied; Francis did not expand the statutory
grounds itself.120 Thus, Francis served as an important recognition
and rectification of inequality but not as a change in statutory
scheme.121 Therefore, section 212(c) relief was unnecessary when a
petitioner’s ground for deportation had no comparable ground for
exclusion.122
In In re Wadud, the petitioner argued that his ground for de
portation, a conviction for visa fraud, was comparable to the CIMT
ground for exclusion.123 Specifically, Wadud argued that because
visa fraud involved moral turpitude and a CIMT is a ground for
inadmissibility, he was thus eligible for section 212(c) relief.124 The
BIA concluded the opposite but acknowledged that its dictum in In
re Granados may have misled the petitioner to make his CIMT ar
gument. The court clarified, “[W]e need not determine whether the
respondent’s conviction was one involving moral turpitude because
we decline to expand the scope of section 212(c) relief in cases
118. In re Meza, 20 I. & N. Dec. 257, 258 (B.I.A. 1991); In re Hernandez-Casillas,
20 I. & N. Dec. 262, 264-65 (B.I.A. 1990), disapproved by 20 I. & N. Dec. 280 (Att’y
Gen. 1991), aff’d sub nom. Hernandez-Casillas v. INS, 983 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1993)
(unpublished table opinion); In re Wadud, 19 I. & N. Dec. 182, 184-85 (B.I.A. 1984).
119. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
120. In re Granados, 16 I. & N. Dec. 726, 728-29 (B.I.A. 1976).
121. See In re Blake, 23 I. & N. Dec. 722, 724 (B.I.A. 2005), vacated sub nom.
Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2007); In re Granados, 16 I. & N. Dec. at 728-29;
see also Griffith, supra note 80, at 94-95 (“[I]t could be that Francis did not really provide a new remedy, but merely imposed a requirement of equal treatment for aliens in
similar situations.”); Daniel Kanstroom, Surrounding the Hole in the Doughnut: Discre
tion and Deference in U.S. Immigration Law, 71 TUL. L. REV. 703, 786 (1997).
122. In re Granados, 16 I. & N. Dec. at 728-29; see Griffith, supra note 80, at 95.
123. In re Wadud, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 185. The petitioner relied on language in
Granados indicating that had Granados’s crime been one of moral turpitude, he might
have qualified for section 212(c) relief. Id.
124. Id.

R

R

R
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where the ground of deportablility charged is not also a ground of
[exclusion].”125
Perhaps most significant in solidifying the comparable-grounds
approach was the decision the Attorney General handed down in
In re Hernandez-Casillas.126 One year prior, in In re Silva, the BIA
had in fact reversed its comparable-grounds approach, making sec
tion 212(c) eligibility available to all deportable LPRs except those
specifically precluded from relief by the statute.127 The Attorney
General in In re Hernandez-Casillas declined to address In re Silva
directly but nonetheless under the constitutional limitations set out
in Francis and In re Silva he concluded that the BIA “erred in hold
ing that relief under section 212(c) may be afforded for grounds for
deportation that are not grounds for exclusion made waivable by
the terms of section 212(c).”128
The Attorney General’s basis for his disapproval was two-fold.
First, the Attorney General concluded that the BIA incorrectly as
serted that In re Silva and In re Hernandez-Casillas were equally
removed from section 212(c) as written. Rather, its further expan
sion of section 212(c) in In re Hernandez-Casillas had no resem
blance to the text and would “take immigration practice even
further from the statutory text.”129 In contrast, In re Silva still had
some connection to the text as it “permit[ed] waivers of only those
grounds for deportation that Congress expressly made waivable in
the related context of exclusion.”130
Second, the Attorney General found that the scope of the
equal protection guarantee should reach only those who have com
125. Id.; see also Griffith, supra note 80, at 96 (“If the BIA had supported relief
for [noncitizens] convicted of offenses involving moral turpitude, it would have re
warded deportable aliens whose more serious offenses could be tied to exclusion under
section 212(a)(9), while denying relief to other aliens convicted of lesser crimes involv
ing moral turpitude.”).
126. In re Hernandez-Casillas, 20 I. & N. Dec. 280 (Att’y Gen. 1991), disapprov
ing 20 I. & N. Dec. 262 (B.I.A. 1990), aff’d sub nom. Hernandez-Casillas v. INS, 983
F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1993) (unpublished table opinion). The Attorney General may re
view final BIA decisions either by choice or request. Id. at 286 n.7.
127. Id. at 266 (B.I.A.).
128. Id. at 286-87 (Att’y Gen.). The Attorney General further stated that when a
“particular ground for deportation has no counterpart among the grounds for exclu
sion,” section 212(c) discretionary relief is unavailable. Id. at 288 (emphasis added).
129. Id. at 287.
130. Id. The Attorney General also concluded that such an extension of section
212(c) relief to deportation cases would override the proof required when granting re
lief under section 244(a)(1) of the INA. For example, the extension would make moot
Congress’s requirements such as “good moral character” and “extreme hardship” for
granting discretionary relief from deportation. Id.

R
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parable grounds for deportation and exclusion.131 He explained
that Francis and In re Silva require “at most, that an alien subject to
deportation must have the same opportunity to seek discretionary
relief as an alien who has temporarily left this country and, upon
reentry, been subject to exclusion.”132 The Attorney General found
the BIA’s “bald assertion” that there was “no reason not to make
[section 212(c)] applicable to all grounds of deportability” as insuf
ficient to support its decision to “wrench away even further from
the statutory text.”133 The Attorney General’s opinion left no ques
tion that the comparable-grounds approach was necessary to deter
mine eligibility for section 212(c) relief.134
Two months later, the BIA first addressed a case involving an
aggravated felony ground for deportation.135 Recall that in 1988
Congress first added the aggravated felony ground for deportation
and from that point on, the grounds have become more elaborate,
developing into a class unto itself.136 In In re Meza, the BIA ap
plied the comparable-grounds test to an LPR deportable for an ag
gravated felony conviction.137 Despite no reference to “aggravated
felonies” in the various grounds for exclusion, the BIA concluded
that “a waiver under section 212(c) is not unavailable to an alien
convicted of an aggravated felony simply because there is no
ground of exclusion which recites the words, ‘convicted of an aggra
vated felony,’ as in section 241(a)(4)(B) of the [INA].”138 Instead,
131. Id. at 287-88.
132. Id. at 287.
133. Id. at 289. The Attorney General concluded that “[a]bsent some super
vening affirmative justification based upon a requirement of the Constitution or other
applicable law, neither the Board nor I may depart—or, in this instance, extend an
earlier departure—from the terms of the statute we are bound to enforce.” Id. at 289;
see Griffith, supra note 80, at 97 (“The recognition of a waiver for all deportation
grounds (except those expressly excluded by section 212(c)) would effectively have
taken the statute beyond the grounds governing exclusion.”).
134. In re Hernandez-Casillas, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 288 (Att’y Gen.) (“Under no
plausible understanding of equal protection principles must discretionary relief be
made available in deportation cases where the ground for deportation could not be
waived if asserted in an exclusion case . . . .”). The Attorney General refused to “go
beyond the constitutionally mandated minimum by opening the floodgates to all depor
tation grounds.” Griffith, supra note 80, at 97; see also Kanstroom, supra note 121, at
789-93 (discussing the BIA and Attorney General decisions in Hernandez-Casillas).
135. In re Meza, 20 I. & N. Dec. 257 (B.I.A. 1991).
136. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
137. In re Meza, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 259.
138. Id. (emphasis added); see Zamora-Mallari v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 679, 685
(7th Cir. 2008) (discussing the comparable grounds analysis of In re Meza and noting
that “[s]ection 241 (a)(4)(B) of the INA provided for deportation for those convicted of
aggravated felonies, whereas § 212(a) does not provide for exclusion of those convicted

R

R

R
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the BIA chose to look to the provision of the INA that defined the
aggravated felony to determine whether a comparable ground for
excludability existed.139
The BIA found comparable grounds in sections 101(a)(43)(B)
and 212(a)(23) of the INA.140 In the former, an LPR is deportable
for the aggravated felony of any “illicit trafficking in a controlled
substance . . . including a drug trafficking crime.”141 In the latter, a
noncitizen is excluded from the country for “a violation of (or a
conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law . . . relating to a controlled
substance.”142 However, the BIA qualified that this finding “[was]
limited to the question of eligibility for section 212(c) relief in the
case of a conviction for a drug-trafficking aggravated felony and
[was] based on the specific amendment to section 212(c) regarding
aggravated felonies.”143 The BIA emphasized that its decision did
not alter the comparable-grounds framework limiting section 212(c)
eligibility.144

of aggravated felonies”); In re Blake, 23 I. & N. Dec. 722, 724 (B.I.A. 2005), vacated sub
nom. Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2007).
139. In re Meza, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 259 (looking to the “specific category of aggra
vated felony at issue”). Courts have stated that deportation grounds and exclusion
grounds must be “analogous,” “substantially identical,” “comparable,” or “equivalent.”
See Cabasug v. INS, 847 F.2d 1321, 1326 (9th Cir. 1988); In re Montengro 20 I. & N.
Dec. 603, 606 (B.I.A. 1992); In re Hernandez-Casillas, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 265-66
(B.I.A.); In re Wadud 19 I. & N. Dec. 182, 185-86 (B.I.A. 1984). There is no counter
part if one of the grounds has a “vastly greater scope” than the other, even if the
broader ground may include the narrower ground. In re Jimenez-Santillano, 21 I. & N.
Dec. 567, 573-74 (B.I.A. 1996), aff’d, 120 F.3d 270, No. 96-9532, 1997 WL 447315 (10th
Cir. July 28, 1997) (unpublished table decision).
140. In re Meza, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 259. In 1990, section 212(a)(23) of the Immi
gration and Nationality Act was revised and redesignated at section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II),
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) (2006).
141. INA § 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B).
142. INA § 212(a)(23), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(23)(A)(i)(II).
143. In re Meza, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 259; see also In re Montengro, 20 I. & N. Dec.
603, 605 (B.I.A. 1992) (“[S]ome aggravated felons are eligible for a section 212(c)
waiver in deportation proceedings even though there is no single comparable ground of
exclusion based on conviction of an aggravated felony.”).
144. In re Meza, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 259; see In re Montenegro, 20 I. & N. Dec. at
605 (finding LPR deportable based on conviction for assault with a firearm and distin
guishing In re Meza as a singular matter); In re Esposito, 21 I. & N. Dec. 1, 21 (B.I.A.
1995) (“Meza . . . is limited to the question of eligibility for section 212(c) relief in the
case of a conviction for drug-trafficking aggravated felony and is based on the specific
amendment to section 212(c) regarding aggravated felonies.”); In re Blake, 23 I. & N.
Dec. 722, 725 (B.I.A. 2005), vacated sub nom. Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88 (2d Cir.
2007).

\\server05\productn\W\WNE\32-2\WNE205.txt

2010]

unknown

Seq: 23

24-MAY-10

212(C) RELIEF—THE GROUND OR THE OFFENSE?

16:05

439

2. DHS Promulgates the Statutory-Counterpart Test
In re Meza and its progeny evidenced that the comparablegrounds analysis was a competent measure for determining eligibil
ity for an LPR deportable on an aggravated felony conviction.
From In re Hernandez-Casillas forward, the BIA maintained the
Attorney General’s comparable-grounds approach, and in 2004 the
Department of Homeland Security published its federal regulation
codifying the approach with the phrase “statutory counterpart.”145
Two years earlier, the Department of Justice published pro
posed amendments that influenced the drafting of the rule.146 One
specific proposed amendment stated that in order to qualify for dis
cretionary relief under 212(c), “[a]n applicant must, at a minimum,
meet the following criteria . . . [that he or she] is deportable or
removable on a ground that has a corresponding ground of exclu
sion or inadmissibility.”147 Also, the supplementary information to
the final rule explained that during the prescribed comment period,
the DHS received one request for clarification regarding aggra
vated felonies.148 The comment suggested that any noncitizen
found deportable as an aggravated felon should be ineligible for
section 212(c) relief “if there is no comparable ground of inadmissi
bility for the specific category of aggravated felony charged.”149
The DHS agreed with the commenter’s suggestion and codified the
comparable-grounds approach formally as the statutory-counter
part test.150

145. 8 C.F.R. § 1212.3(f)(5) (2009). Under the regulation a petitioner is ineligible
for relief where he or she “is deportable under former section 241 of the Act or remov
able under section 237 of the Act on a ground which does not have a statutory counter
part in section 212 of the Act.” Id. (emphasis added).
146. Section 212(c) Relief for Aliens with Certain Criminal Convictions Before
April 1, 1997, 67 Fed. Reg. 52,627 (proposed Aug. 13, 2002).
147. Id. at 52,628-29; see Section 212(c) Relief for Aliens with Certain Criminal
Convictions Before April 1, 1997, 69 Fed. Reg. 57,826, 57,832 (Sept. 28, 2004) (codified
at 8 C.F.R. pts. 1003, 1212, and 1240) (“[A]n alien who is deportable or removable on a
ground that does not have a corresponding ground of exclusion or inadmissibility is
ineligible for section 212(c) relief.”).
148. See Section 212(c) Relief for Aliens with Certain Criminal Convictions
Before April 1, 1997, 69 Fed. Reg. at 57,831.
149. Id. The commenter explained that “[f]or example, the rule should not apply
to [those who are deportable] under specific types or categories of aggravated felonies
such as Murder, Rape, or Sexual Abuse of a Minor.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted); see Blake, 489 F.3d at 97 (discussing the comment).
150. 8 C.F.R. § 1212.3(f)(5).
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3. Statutory-Counterpart Jurisprudence
In 2005, the BIA for the first time applied the new statutorycounterpart test in In re Blake.151 The BIA determined that peti
tioner, Leroy Blake, deportable under the aggravated felony
ground of deportation for sexual abuse of a minor, was not eligible
for section 212(c) relief.152 The BIA acknowledged that the only
possible statutory counterpart in Blake’s case was the inadmissibil
ity provision for a CIMT and further stated that statutory counter
parts “need not be a perfect match” to qualify for eligibility.153
Accordingly, the BIA stressed, “Congress [must have] employed
similar language to describe substantially equivalent categories of
offenses.”154 The BIA reasoned that the CIMT ground for exclu
sion addressed a “much broader category of offenses” than the ag
gravated felony provision for sexual abuse of a minor155 and
rejected Blake’s argument that the CIMT ground for exclusion was
comparable to his aggravated felony charge.156
That same year, the BIA decided In re Brieva-Perez, which fur
ther clarified the statutory-counterpart analysis.157 There, the BIA
denied section 212(c) relief to the petitioner, who was deportable
on an aggravated felony of a crime of violence—the unauthorized
use of a motor vehicle.158 The BIA held that the crime of violence
ground for deportation lacked a statutory counterpart in the CIMT
151. 23 I. & N. Dec. 722 (B.I.A. 2005), vacated sub nom. Blake v. Carbone, 489
F.3d 88.
152. Id. at 723. Blake was charged under INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227 (a)(2)(A)(iii), as an alien convicted of sexual abuse of a minor, which is an ag
gravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A). Id. The immi
gration judge concluded that the types of offenses described in section 101(a)(43)(A) of
the Act had a comparable ground of exclusion in that nearly all such offenses involve
moral turpitude. Id. The immigration judge granted Blake a section 212(c) waiver and
terminated deportation proceedings. Id. The DHS appealed to the BIA, which re
versed the lower judge’s holding. Id.
153. Id. at 729.
154. Id. at 728.
155. Id. The BIA distinguished its decision in In re Meza and further explained
that “although there may be considerable overlap between offenses categorized as sex
ual abuse of a minor and those considered crimes of moral turpitude, these two catego
ries of offenses are not statutory counterparts.” Id. at 728. Furthermore, the grounds
lacked sufficiently similar language. Id.
156. Id. at 727.
157. In re Brieva-Perez, 23 I. & N. Dec. 766 (B.I.A. 2005), aff’d sub nom. BrievaPerez v. Gonzales, 482 F.3d 356 (5th Cir. 2007).
158. Id. at 767, 773.
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ground for exclusion.159 Due to the “distinctly different terminol
ogy used to describe the two categories of offenses and the signifi
cant variance in the types of offenses covered by [the] two
provisions,” the BIA denied eligibility.160
B. The Circuit Split
1. Comparable-Grounds Approach: The First, Third, Fifth,
Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuits
The courts of appeals have jurisdiction to review constitutional
claims or questions of law raised upon a petition for review from a
final decision of the BIA.161 And the question of whether a peti
tioner is eligible for section 212(c) relief is one “of law, unlike the
discretionary and unreviewable decision of whether such a waiver
ultimately should be granted.”162 In addressing the question of sec
tion 212(c) eligibility, the majority of courts of appeals follow the
comparable-grounds approach.163 These courts have rejected a
more fact-based approach often urged by petitioners, whereby the
court would have to look at the underlying offense of the deporta
tion charge to determine whether a comparable ground existed.164
For example, the Tenth Circuit rejected the argument that obtaining
fraudulent documents for illegal noncitizens present in the United
States and the exclusionary ground for fraudulently procuring a visa
or other documentation for entry into the United States were statu
159. Id. at 773 (“Although there need not be perfect symmetry in order to find
that a ground of removal has a statutory counterpart in section 212(a), there must be a
closer match than that exhibited by [an] incidental overlap . . . .”).
160. Id.
161. See INA § 242(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) (2006); see also Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88, 98 n.7 (2d Cir. 2007).
162. Blake, 489 F.3d at 98 n.7.
163. See, e.g., Thap v. Mukasey, 544 F.3d 674 (6th Cir. 2008); Gonzalez-Mesias v.
Mukasey, 529 F.3d 62 (1st Cir. 2008); Zamora-Mallari v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 679 (7th
Cir. 2008); Vue v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 858 (8th Cir. 2007); Dalombo Fontes v. Gonzales,
483 F.3d 115 (1st Cir. 2007); Dung Tri Vo v. Gonzales, 482 F.3d 363 (5th Cir. 2007);
Brieva-Perez v. Gonzales, 482 F.3d 356 (5th Cir. 2007); Avilez-Granados v. Gonzales,
481 F.3d 869 (5th Cir. 2007); Caroleo v. Gonzalez, 476 F.3d 158 (3d Cir. 2007); Valere v.
Gonzales, 473 F.3d 757 (7th Cir. 2007); Kim v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. 2006);
Soriano v. Gonzales, 489 F.3d 909 (8th Cir. 2006) (per curiam); Rubio v. U.S. Attorney
Gen., 182 F. App’x 925 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam); Jimenez-Santillano v. INS, 120
F.3d 270, No. 96-9532, 1997 WL 447315 (10th Cir. July 28, 1997) (unpublished table
decision). Contra Abebe v. Mukasey, 554 F.3d 1203 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam); Web
ster v. Mukasey, 259 F. App’x 375 (2d Cir. 2008); Blake, 489 F.3d at 104.
164. See, e.g., Dung Tri Vo, 482 F.3d at 372; Avilez-Granados, 481 F.3d at 872;
Caroleo, 476 F.3d at 164; Kim, 468 F.3d at 62.
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tory counterparts.165 Moreover, the Third Circuit concluded that
“the underlying crime for which [the petitioner] was convicted plays
no role in determining eligibility for a [section] 212(c) waiver.”166
The Fifth Circuit reemphasized that the extension of section 212(c)
relief to those with comparable grounds of deportability and exclu
sion is a limited category, merely an addition to the certain group
Congress chose years ago.167 If it is not limited, then almost any
LPR could make the argument that his or her deportation charge is
so serious that it constitutes the broad exclusionary provision of a
CIMT.168 The consistent analyses in the various courts of appeals
show a wide acceptance of the comparable-grounds approach.
Moreover, the courts are now simply adhering to federal regulation.
The focus in the analysis remains the same: a comparison of the
grounds for deportation and exclusion as written by Congress.
2. Offense-Specific Approach: The Second Circuit
In Blake v. Carbone, the Second Circuit employed its own ap
proach to determine whether a lawful permanent resident charged
with an aggravated felony ground for deportation is eligible for sec
tion 212(c) relief.169 To support its reasoning, the court referred
back to the thirty-year-old case Francis v. INS.170 Based on the
equal protection holding of Francis, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals became the sole appellate court to form its comparison of
the deportation and exclusion provisions not on the language of the
grounds but instead on the offense committed by the petitioner.171
In 2007, the court heard the consolidated claims of four peti
tioners: Leroy Blake, Ho Yoon Chong, Errol Foster, and Aundre
Singh.172 Each petitioner argued that the BIA incorrectly denied
him eligibility for section 212(c) relief.173 In 1992, Blake pled guilty
165. Jimenez-Santillano, 1997 WL 447315, at *2; see also, e.g., Leal-Rodriguez v.
INS, 990 F.2d 939 (7th Cir. 1993); Campos v. INS, 961 F.2d 309 (1st Cir. 1992).
166. Calderon-Minchola v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 258 F. App’x 425, 427 (3d Cir.
2007) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
167. Dung Tri Vo, 482 F.3d at 372.
168. See Dalombo Fontes, 483 F.3d at 123 (“Given the possible breadth of the
moral turpitude concept, almost anyone could argue that although found deportable for
a serious unwaivable crime, waiver authority should be interpolated because the crime
was also one of moral turpitude.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
169. Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2007).
170. Id. at 102.
171. See id. at 103 (“Rather than adopt this overly broad approach, petitioners’
eligibility for a [section] 212(c) waiver must turn on their particular criminal offenses.”).
172. Id. at 91-93.
173. Id. at 100.
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to first-degree sexual abuse of a minor.174 At some point between
1993 and 1994, Ho Yoon Chong pled guilty to racketeering
charges.175 In 1990, Foster pled guilty to first-degree manslaugh
ter.176 And in 1986, Singh pled guilty to second-degree murder.177
Deportation proceedings were initiated against each petitioner on
the basis that each committed an aggravated felony after admission
to the United States.178 The aggravated felony provision of the
INA was applied retroactively to the petitioners pursuant to
IIRIRA.179
The four petitioners challenged the BIA’s conclusion that they
were ineligible for a section 212(c) waiver, arguing that a statutory
counterpart existed in the exclusionary ground of a CIMT because
either “all aggravated felonies are crimes of moral turpitude, or, in
the alternative, their individual aggravated felonies could form the
basis of a ground for exclusion.”180 The Second Circuit agreed with
the petitioners’ alternative argument that an aggravated felony
ground for deportation could have a counterpart ground of exclu
sion.181 Moreover, the court found “no reason to defer to the
BIA’s interpretation of the statutory counterpart rule [concluding]
that the BIA’s comparable grounds analysis fail[ed] to comport
with Francis.”182
For its analysis, the Second Circuit first had to determine
whether deference should be afforded to the BIA’s interpretation
of the statutory-counterpart rule.183 The standard to determine the
applicable level of deference is set out in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
174. Id. at 91.
175. Id. at 92.
176. Id.
177. See id. at 93.
178. Id. at 91-93; see INA § 237(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2006).
179. See INA § 101, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (“[T]he term applies regardless of
whether the conviction was entered before, on, or after September 30, 1996.”).
180. Blake, 489 F.3d at 100. Petitioners also argued that the statutory-counter
part rule had an impermissible retroactive effect. Id. at 98. That is, but for the federal
regulation, they would have been eligible for the waiver when they pled guilty. Id.
They also argued that the rule was contrary to congressional intent because Congress
intended section 212(c) waivers to apply to all deportees with aggravated felony convic
tions. Id. at 99. The Second Circuit dismissed the first argument, holding that the rule
did not have an impermissible retroactive effect because it did “nothing more than crys
tallize the agency’s preexisting body of law.” Id. at 98. Next, the court rejected the
second argument, holding that evidence of such intent was too weak considering the
promulgation of the new rule. Id. at 99.
181. Id. at 104.
182. Id. at 100.
183. Id. at 99-100.
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Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 184 The two-part Chevron
framework requires courts to first look at the language of the stat
ute and determine whether it is clear or ambiguous.185 If the statu
tory language is clear, then the matter is over and “the court, as
well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed
intent of Congress.”186 If the statutory language is ambiguous, then
the court moves on to step two, where it considers whether the
agency’s interpretation is a reasonable one.187
The Second Circuit determined that the Chevron doctrine was
not applicable; therefore, it was not required to follow the BIA’s
comparable-grounds approach.188 The court found that the govern
ment could not point to any ambiguity in section 212(c).189 Thus,
the government could not “stand on firm Chevron ground.”190 Be
cause section 212(c) plainly stated that the Attorney General could
not grant waivers to LPRs who were “under an order of deporta
tion,” there was no statutory ambiguity in its terms.191 Conse
quently, the court found that “[a]ny difficulty in determining
[section] 212(c)’s applicability to deportees arises not from the stat
utory language but from the BIA’s gloss on Francis.”192
With the deference question resolved, the court was free to
consider whether the petitioners’ particular offenses had counter
part grounds of exclusion that would, under Francis, trigger section
184. Id. at 100 (“Chevron’s familiar rubric requires a court to defer to an agency’s
interpretation of a statute it is charged with enforcing should the court conclude the
agency has provided a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute.”); see Chev
ron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
185. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. The BIA is able to interpret and enforce the
language of the INA through the authority of the Attorney General, the head of the
Department of Justice. Blake, 489 F.3d at 100. The BIA may “fill statutory gaps with
reasonable interpretations.” Id. (citing INA § 103, 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (2006)).
186. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
187. Id. at 843.
188. Blake, 489 F.3d at 100.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994) (repealed 1996)).
192. Id. The Second Circuit continued, “The statutory counterpart rule . . . is a
creature of constitutional avoidance, arising from ‘the ramifications of a prior constitu
tional decision of this court, rather than the original statute concerning whose interpre
tation the Attorney General has conceded expertise.’” Id. (quoting Bedoya-Valencia v.
INS, 6 F.3d 891, 898 (2d Cir. 1993)). “However, in Bedoya-Valencia, [the court] found
appropriate a modest extension of Francis’s mandate in cases where the ground of de
portation could have no conceivable analogue in exclusion proceedings,” and justified
its holding “in terms of coherence and clarity, not equal protection.” Id. at 96 (empha
sis added) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
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212(c) relief.193 Consequently, the court held that the “petitioners’
eligibility for a [section] 212(c) waiver must turn on their particular
criminal offenses.”194 In other words, the court chose to shift the
focus of the statutory-counterpart analysis from a comparison of
statutory grounds to a comparison of offenses.
This offense-specific approach echoed the Second Circuit’s de
cision in Francis in that the rationale for the approach was based on
equal protection principles.195 Compelled to follow its own prece
dent, the Second Circuit concluded, “if petitioners’ underlying ag
gravated felony offenses could form the basis of a ground of
exclusion, they will be eligible for a [section] 212(c) waiver.”196
Each petitioner’s case was then remanded to determine whether his
aggravated-felony offense could also form a basis of exclusion as a
CIMT.197 The court deemed its holding consistent with Francis,
with the Attorney General’s discretionary power as confined by the
grounds of exclusion in section 212(a), and with BIA precedent.198
3. Repudiation of Francis and Section 212(c) Relief: The
Ninth Circuit
In its historic decision, Abebe v. Mukasey, the Ninth Circuit
reversed its long-standing adoption of both the equal protection
holding of Francis and the BIA’s comparable-grounds approach.199
Previously, petitioner Abebe was found ineligible for section 212(c)
relief by both the immigration judge and the BIA.200 On its initial
review, the Ninth Circuit’s three-judge panel affirmed and held that
193. Id. at 100. The court, however, noted that the petitioners’ statutory-counter
part argument was a failed syllogism: an aggravated felony requires an act of moral
turpitude; we committed aggravated felonies; therefore, our aggravated felonies are
acts of moral turpitude. Id. at 102. The court explained that not all aggravated felonies
constitute crimes involving moral turpitude and vice versa. Id. at 102-03.
194. Id. at 103. The Second Circuit rejected the government’s contention that the
provisions should be the sole source of comparison and found such a focus on similar
language “strange” and difficult to measure. See id. at 102 & n.10.
195. See id. at 103-04.
196. Id. at 104 (emphasis added). The court stressed that “[w]hile hindsight
might pin much of this confusion on Francis, we are bound to finish what our predeces
sors started.” Id. at 105.
197. Id.
198. See id. at 104.
199. Abebe v. Mukasey (Abebe II), 554 F.3d 1203 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (per
curiam). The Ninth Circuit first adopted Francis in Tapia-Acuna v. INS, 640 F.2d 223
(9th Cir. 1981), overruled by Abebe II, 554 F.3d 1203, and the BIA’s comparablegrounds test in Komarenko v. INS, 35 F.3d 432 (9th Cir. 1994), abrogated by Abebe II,
554 F.3d 1203.
200. Abebe II, 554 F.3d at 1204-05.
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Abebe’s aggravated felony ground for deportation (sexual abuse of
a minor) was not substantially identical to the CIMT ground of ex
clusion based on the comparable-grounds test it had adopted over a
decade earlier.201
The Ninth Circuit’s recent en banc opinion repudiated Francis
and overruled Tapia-Acuna v. INS, stating “that there’s no rational
basis for providing section 212(c) relief from [exclusion], but not
deportation.”202 Instead, it employed a standard of “bare rational
ity” and offered a legitimate reason for the different treatment of
deportees who are similarly situated to excludees but for a tempo
rary departure from the country.203 In doing so, the Ninth Circuit
dismissed the need for any equal protection analysis and the eligi
bility approaches discussed above.204 Thus, it rejected Francis, In re
Silva, and the comparable-grounds test entirely.205
In reaching this conclusion, the Abebe court explained as
follows:
Congress could have limited section 212(c) relief to aliens seek
ing to enter the country from abroad in order to “create[ ] an
incentive for deportable aliens to leave the country.” A deport
able alien who wishes to obtain section 212(c) relief will know
that he can’t obtain such relief so long as he remains in the
United States; if he departs the United States, however, he could
become eligible for such relief. By encouraging such self-depor
tation, the government could save resources it would otherwise
devote to arresting and deporting these aliens. Saving scarce re
sources that would otherwise be paid for by taxpayers is certainly
a legitimate congressional objective.206

Moreover, the court reasoned that because the section 212(c)
waiver, by its plain language, only provided relief from exclusion,
Abebe was initially never eligible for section 212(c) relief, and,
thus, the issue of an equal protection violation was moot.207 After
reevaluating the “complex legislative scheme” regarding section
212(c) waivers, the Ninth Circuit was able to avoid the debate be
201. Abebe v. Gonzales (Abebe I), 493 F.3d 1092, 1105-06 (9th Cir. 2007), reh’g
en banc sub nom. Abebe v. Mukasey, 554 F.3d 1203.
202. Abebe II, 554 F.3d at 1207. The court additionally rejected Kormarenko as
“a dead letter.” Id.
203. Id. at 1206 (asking “whether [it could] conceive of a rational reason Con
gress may have had in adopting [section 212(c) waivers]”).
204. Id. at 1207.
205. See id.
206. Id. at 1206 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
207. Id. at 1207.
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tween the comparable-grounds and offense-specific approach.208
Rather, the Ninth Circuit provides the simple result that deportable
LPRs in its jurisdiction who have not left the country are not eligi
ble for section 212(c) relief.209
IV.

ANALYSIS

Absent congressional action, the appropriate approach to de
termine whether a petitioner is eligible for section 212(c) relief re
mains the comparable-grounds approach, now codified in the
statutory-counterpart rule. Congressional intent and administrative
policy make it clear that the comparable-grounds approach is pre
ferred. To disregard these principles of law is to disregard the
proper channels in determining the law.
Moreover, the rationale employed in Blake v. Carbone, specifi
cally the court’s reliance on the equal protection holding of Francis
v. INS, is faulty. The facts from which the issue arose in Francis are
not analogous to the facts in Blake, nor does the scope of Francis
reach the issue in Blake. Further, Francis rests on shaky ground as
a valid immigration decision because equal protection rights are
rarely afforded to noncitizens.
Additionally, the Second Circuit’s offense-specific approach
needlessly creates more confusion related to section 212(c) relief of
deportation. By allowing petitioners to argue that their aggravated
felony crimes of deportation could form the basis of CIMT, a vari
ety of problems arise. Immigration courts will be bogged down
with case-by-case, fact-specific analyses. The courts of appeals will
have to deal with the results. The jurisprudence will be confused
because of a lack of consistency surrounding CIMTs.
Conversely, the comparable-grounds approach provides uni
formity across the federal circuits. It maintains consistency among
cases because of its clear framework. Lastly, as the mere codifica
tion of established case law, the application of the comparablegrounds approach is already clear, thereby avoiding additional
confusion.
A. Congressional and Administrative Policy Considerations
Before addressing the flaws of the Second Circuit’s reliance on
Francis, certain policy considerations that arise with the offense
208.
209.

Id. at 1206.
Id.
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specific approach must be addressed. First, by opening the door to
allow more LPRs section 212(c) relief, this approach contradicts
legislative intent. Second, the court’s failure to give proper defer
ence to the BIA under Chevron undermines the validity of its
offense-specific approach.
1. Rejection of Congressional Intent
As discussed earlier in this Note, in the 1990s, Congress en
acted new immigration laws, amended current statutes, and re
pealed certain sections of the INA, including section 212(c).210
With respect to section 212(c), the progression followed from limit
ing eligibility available to certain aggravated felons to eliminating
section 212(c) relief altogether.211 In other words, more LPRs were
going to be deported. Thus, it can be inferred from these changes
that Congress intended for the increase in deportation of LPRs and
especially those convicted of aggravated felonies as defined by the
INA. Furthermore, Congress had multiple opportunities to add
certain aggravated felonies to the list of exclusionary grounds,
thereby creating a statutory counterpart for certain deportation
grounds, but it has never done so.
In Blake v. Carbone, the Second Circuit remanded each peti
tioner’s case to the BIA to determine whether his deportable of
fense could form the basis of a CIMT.212 If so, the petitioner was
then eligible for section 212(c) relief.213 The Second Circuit had to
have been aware that this analysis paved the way for more LPRs
deportable on aggravated felony grounds to remain in the coun
try.214 Therefore, the eventual consequence of its approach was a
decrease in deportations. By extending the possibility of section
212(c) eligibility to the four petitioners in Blake, the Second Circuit
directly contradicted congressional intent.
Interestingly, the Second Circuit had previously addressed the
issue of congressional intent in Cato v. INS.215 There, the Second
Circuit concluded that the petitioner’s argument that Congress in
tended section 212(c) to be a broad, forgiving provision cognizant
210. See supra notes 93-106 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
212. Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88, 105 (2d Cir. 2007).
213. Id.
214. The court did assert that it “neither made a [section] 212(c) waiver available
to all deportees with an aggravated felony conviction, nor put deportees in a better
position than excludees.” Id. at 104.
215. Cato v. INS, 84 F.3d 597, 600 (2d Cir. 1996).

R
R
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of humanitarian concerns “[flew] in the teeth of the statute itself,
which unequivocally provides relief only for excludees, and, then,
only for certain specified grounds of exclusion . . . [and] flout[ed]
the legislative history, which indicates that Congress intended that
[section] 212(c) relief be granted sparingly.”216 The Second Circuit
then pointed out that it had rejected a similar argument in Francis
v. INS, stating that if Congress had wanted to grant generous relief,
then the result in Francis would have been far broader than its nar
row holding pertaining to analogous grounds of exclusion.217 The
court’s statements in Cato make its complete disregard of congres
sional intent in Blake curious.218 On the one hand, it had already
acknowledged that Congress did not intend to grant broad relief,
which would allow more criminal LPRs to remain in the country.
Yet, some years after, when applying its own offense-specific ap
proach, the court chose to ignore precedent and instead contra
dicted congressional intent.
The Second Circuit’s rejection of congressional intent in Blake
not only created a way to counter the increase in the number of
deportations, but it also created an obstacle to judicial efficiency.
When the possibility of relief increases, so do the number of peti
tioners seeking relief. Because under the offense-specific approach
it is possible for an aggravated felony offense to form the basis of a
CIMT and all LPRs convicted of aggravated felony must be de
ported, it follows that most LPRs will try to obtain eligibility for
relief. Thus, if courts were to adhere to the offense-specific ap
proach, there would be an influx of petitioners. Frankly, it would
be a mistake for a deportable LPR not to argue that the facts of his
216. Id. (emphasis added); see H.R. REP. NO. 82-1365, at 51 (1952), reprinted in
1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1653, 1705 (“[A]ny discretionary authority to waive the grounds for
exclusion should be carefully restricted to those cases where extenuating circumstances
clearly require such action and . . . the discretionary authority should be surrounded
with strict limitations.”).
217. Cato, 84 F.3d at 600 (“[I]f Congress wished to provide sweeping and gener
ous relief to all deportees with substantial ties to the country, we would have recognized
this gesture in Francis, and would not have narrowed our holding to deportees who can
show an analogous ground of exclusion in [section] 212(a).”); see also Leal-Rodriguez v.
INS, 990 F.2d 939, 949-50 (7th Cir. 1993) (“To extend relief to other classes of deport
able aliens would only further disrupt Congress’s scheme for awarding discretionary
relief, which deliberately set the eligibility bar higher in cases of deportation than those
involving exclusion.”).
218. Perhaps St. Cyr opened the door for courts to interpret Congress’s intent
more flexibly. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 315-16 (2001). By holding AEDPA and
IIRIRA unlawfully retroactive, the Supreme Court’s clarification allowed the judicial
branch to reinterpret legislative intent rather than have Congress restate the statute.
Id.
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crime, regardless of the ground of deportation charged, could
amount to a CIMT.
However, such an influx would hamper an already overloaded
administrative immigration system. Moreover, the case-by-case
factual analysis required in the offense-specific approach would
make for lengthier court proceedings and cause an increase in the
number of petitions for review in the federal courts of appeals. In
turn, petitioners would be held in detention for longer durations in
direct relation to longer case postures. Ultimately, administrative
and judicial resources would be increasingly overextended.
2. Failure to Properly Defer to the BIA
It is general policy that courts should defer to congressional
authority. In turn, courts should also defer to the agencies that
Congress creates to handle certain areas of the law. As an exten
sion of the Department of Justice and through the powers delegated
by the Attorney General, the BIA enforces and interprets immigra
tion law.219 Therefore, courts of appeals must afford the BIA
proper deference, particularly when it comes to its interpretation of
statutes and regulations. However, the Blake court made it a point
to avoid such deference. In doing so, the Second Circuit incorrectly
ignored the general administrative policy stated above and, more
specifically, the Chevron doctrine.220 Further, when the Second
Circuit refused to defer to the BIA’s interpretation of section
212(c), which allowed the court to implement its offense-specific
approach, the court again made a conclusion contrary to one it had
made previously in Cato v. INS.221 Upon closer look, the Second
Circuit dismissed the government’s Chevron argument with an un
settling analysis that contradicted its own statements in Cato and
failed to properly follow the well-understood two-step Chevron
process.
In Cato, the Second Circuit explained that its reasoning in a
related case was motivated in part “by the lack of legislative gui
219. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
220. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984); see, e.g., Evangelista v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 145, 150 (2d Cir. 2004) (“We review
the BIA’s interpretation of ambiguous provisions of the INA . . . with substantial defer
ence . . . .”); Okoroha v. INS, 715 F.2d 380, 382 (8th Cir. 1983) (“This court . . . must
give deference to an agency’s interpretation of a statute that it is charged with
administering.”).
221. See Cato, 84 F.3d at 599 (employing the comparable-grounds approach).

R
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dance” in section 212(c).222 The court was referring to a situation
where a ground for exclusion could never exist, but, nonetheless, it
plainly indicated that section 212(c) was unclear.223 Yet, in Blake,
the Second Circuit concluded that the language of section 212(c)
was clear, that is, the government was unable to point to any ambi
guity in the statute.224 According to the court, because the statute
clearly stated that the Attorney General could not provide discre
tionary relief to LPRs under an order of deportation, it had a clear
meaning.225 This is, however, an incorrect application of the first
prong of Chevron. Although the statute is read to pertain only to
excludees, the reality is the statute has been applied in both con
texts of exclusion and deportation since at least the 1950s. Moreo
ver, the Second Circuit had taken issue with the lack of guidance in
section 212(c) regarding deportees whose charge of deportation will
never have a ground of exclusion. Thus, the statute is not clear be
cause it does not address its application in multiple contexts. Nev
ertheless, the court was able to avoid applying Chevron deference
and instead could employ its own approach.
If the Second Circuit had found section 212(c) to be ambigu
ous, it would have likely run into a problem with the second prong,
foreclosing the opportunity to employ its offense-specific approach.
In Cato, the Second Circuit stated that an LPR in deportation pro
ceedings is similarly situated to an LPR in exclusion proceedings
“when the ground for the deportee’s removal . . . is the same as the
ground for the excludee’s denial of admission; thus, a § 212(c)
waiver becomes available in a deportation proceeding if the reason
for deportability is ‘substantially equivalent’ to a ground of exclu
sion listed in § 212(a).”226 This test is essentially the same compara
222. Id. at 600 (emphasis added). The court added that “the Francis rule itself—
which was judicially (not legislatively) crafted—gave rise to the ‘interstitial issue’ [the
court] faced.” Id. (quoting Bedoya-Valencia v. INS, 6 F.3d 891, 897 (2d Cir. 1993)).
Thus, the court shifted the source of its analytical problem from just section 212(c) to
also include its own judicially created Francis rule. However, this finessing of the issue
did not conceal the court’s acknowledgment that there is ambiguity—or lack of gui
dance—in section 212(c). In fact, the court stated that “the Francis rule would promote
‘coherence and consistency’ in the statutory scheme.” Id.
223. Id.
224. Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88, 100 (2d Cir. 2007).
225. Id.
226. Cato, 84 F.3d at 599 (emphasis added); see also Drax v. Reno, 338 F.3d 98,
107 (2d Cir. 2003). Additionally, the Second Circuit held that a petitioner is eligible for
section 212(c) relief when the ground for deportation is one to which no ground for
exclusion could even exist. See Cato, 84 F.3d at 599-600; see also Drax, 338 F.3d at 107
08; Bedoya-Valencia, 6 F.3d at 897.
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ble-grounds analysis that the BIA employed in In re Blake. There,
the BIA held that the test to determine eligibility is “whether Con
gress has employed similar language to describe substantially
equivalent categories of offenses.”227
Although the Second Circuit decided Blake v. Carbone subse
quent to Cato, the precedential value of Cato makes its rationale
worth comparing to the reasoning used in In re Blake. Specifically,
the similarity between these two holdings brings into question the
validity of the Blake court’s conclusion as to the reasonableness (or
second) prong of the Chevron analysis. Accordingly, the Second
Circuit’s conclusion that Chevron deference did not apply in Blake
becomes transparent considering the court had previously used a
comparable-grounds test similar to one used by the BIA. Based on
precedent, the Second Circuit would have had to find the BIA’s test
reasonable if it reached the second prong of the Chevron analy
sis.228 Chevron only requires deference so long as the interpreta
tion is a reasonable one. Because the comparable-grounds test was
indisputably a reasonable one—the Second Circuit had applied the
comparable-grounds rationale in at least two of its earlier deci
sions229—then the Second Circuit would have had to defer to the
BIA’s comparable-grounds approach in Blake. Therefore, the Sec
ond Circuit’s history of using the comparable-grounds approach un
dermines its quick dismissal of Chevron in Blake.
B. Reliance on Francis v. INS
In 2007, when the Second Circuit premised its holding in Blake
v. Carbone on the equal protection rationale of its 1976 decision,
Francis v. INS, the court extended the thirty-year-old holding far
beyond its reach. The court’s reliance on Francis is faulty for three
reasons: (1) the cases are not factually analogous; (2) the scope of
Francis is limited by the facts of each case; and (3) the equal protec
tion rights afforded LPRs may be less than required by Francis.

227. In re Blake, 23 I. & N. Dec. 722, 728 (B.I.A. 2005), vacated sub nom. Blake
v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88.
228. See Cato, 84 F.3d at 600 (stating a deportee is not eligible for relief when
“[t]he deportee’s ground of deportation may be one that could conceivably have an
analogous ground of exclusion under [section] 212(a) but, unhappily, Congress has not
chosen to include that ground in [section] 212(a)”).
229. See, e.g., id.; Bedoya-Valencia, 6 F.3d at 894.
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1. Factual Comparison
In Francis, the Second Circuit remedied a particular factual sit
uation where the ground of deportation charged was exactly the
same as a ground of exclusion so that the only difference between
the deportee and excludee was a departure from the United
States.230 Specifically, Francis was deportable under section
241(a)(11), which stated in relevant part that “[a]ny alien in the
United States . . . shall . . . be deported who . . . at any time has been
convicted of a violation of . . . any law or regulation relating to the
illicit possession of . . . narcotic drugs or marihuana.”231 He pled
guilty and was subsequently convicted of criminal possession of
dangerous drugs (marijuana).232 The comparable exclusionary pro
vision stated in relevant part that “[a]ny alien who has been con
victed of a violation of . . . any law or regulation relating to the illicit
possession of . . . narcotic drugs or marihuana” is deportable.233
This left the excludee who had departed the United States eligible
for relief and the deportee who had not, ineligible.234 As a result,
Francis “expanded the class of aliens to whom [section] 212(c) re
lief is available but did not broaden the statutory grounds on which
it may be applied.”235
In Francis, the language of the grounds for deportation and
exclusion were not only comparable, they were exactly the same.
However, in Blake, none of the aggravated felony grounds for each
petitioner’s deportation charge was an exact match to the CIMT
ground of exclusion. Thus, to rely on Francis as an analogous situa
tion is faulty. The facts of these cases are not analogous; they are
different situations involving distinctly different statutory provi
sions: Francis illustrates how deportation and exclusion grounds can
act as two sides of the same coin satisfying the equal protection test
it mandated, while Blake fails to show how any of the four different
grounds for deportation could work in the same manner with the
CIMT ground of exclusion. This distinction makes the Second Cir
cuit’s basis for relying on Francis somewhat attenuated. The court’s
basis becomes further attenuated when looking at the scope of the
Francis holding.
230. Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268, 272-73 (2d Cir. 1976).
231. See Francis, 532 F.2d at 269 (citing the deportation statute in force at the
time).
232. Id.
233. Id. at 270 n.2 (citing the exclusionary statute in force at the time).
234. Id. at 272-73.
235. Dung Tri Vo v. Gonzales, 482 F.3d 363, 367 (5th Cir. 2007).
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2. Scope of Francis
When the Second Circuit concluded that the petitioners’ claims
in Blake turned on the guarantee of equal protection, it highlighted
what it perceived as the “touchstone in Francis.”236 The court
honed in on the “‘irrelevant and fortuitous’ circumstance of travel
ing abroad recently.”237 Indeed, the trip abroad is what made the
petitioner in deportation proceedings different from the petitioner
in exclusionary proceedings. But, to be sure, it was the same
grounds for deportation and exclusion that made them similarly sit
uated, and to be similarly situated is what is necessary to even con
sider an equal protection claim.
Equal treatment is understood to be “fully accorded” when
resident noncitizens in deportation proceedings can seek relief on
the basis of the same grounds as those noncitizens seeking to re
enter the country.238 Indeed, “more [is] not required by equal pro
tection principles. . . . [T]o go further would flatly contravene the
statutory language limiting the Attorney General’s waiver power to
the grounds specifically referred to in [section] 212(a).”239 The
equal protection component of Francis is only invoked once the
comparable-grounds approach is satisfied. Otherwise, there will
not be two classes of similarly situated people having different re
sults. The comparable-grounds approach establishes whether there
is reason for an equal protection concern at all.240
The Second Circuit broadens the scope of Francis by refusing
to adhere to the limitations of the comparable-grounds approach.241
In going beyond a comparison of statutory text, the court oversteps
the equal protection concerns it had set out to protect in 1976.
Other courts of appeals, unlike the Second Circuit, consider Con
gress’s act of leaving the particular language of 212(c) “substantially
236. Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88, 102 (2d Cir. 2007).
237. Id. (quoting Francis, 532 F.2d at 273); see also id. (“In short, eligibility for
relief in Francis turned on whether the lawful permanent resident’s offense could trig
ger [section] 212(c) were he in exclusion proceedings, not how his offense was catego
rized as a ground of deportation.” (emphasis added)).
238. Campos v. INS, 961 F.2d 309, 313 (1st Cir. 1992).
239. Id. at 313-14.
240. See, e.g., Valere v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 757, 762 (7th Cir. 2007) (“[A] ‘statu
tory counterpart’ . . . is what makes a removable, nondeparting alien similarly situated
to an inadmissible alien in the first place.”); Campos, 961 F.2d at 316 (“Campos is being
treated no differently from any other alien convicted of a crime that is a ground for
deportation but has no corresponding ground for exclusion.”).
241. Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88, 100 (2d Cir. 2007).
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unchanged” as an expression of the “continued desire to limit [sec
tion] 212(c) relief to the listed grounds of exclusion.”242
The Second Circuit views Francis as sanctioning its analysis be
yond the language of the statutes or, rather, beneath the surface of
the statutory grounds, to the offenses committed in order to find
comparable grounds, whereas the majority of Circuits narrowly
construe the language of the statutes to find comparable grounds.
As the Seventh Circuit explained, to go beyond the narrow view
and “hold that the same form of discretionary relief must be availa
ble to aliens deportable for different, but arguably comparable, vio
lations is to interfere again, on an even weaker rationale, with
Congress’s scheme for regulating aliens.”243 Further, to allow for
such a distant relationship between the grounds is a failure to act in
accordance with the boundaries set out in Francis.
3. Equal Protection as Applied to LPRs
Irrespective of the impact of Francis, the decision itself does
not carry as much weight as the Second Circuit purports. The ques
tion remains whether LPRs are afforded the type of equal protec
tion rights granted to the petitioners in Blake. Francis proceeds
under the tenet “that the constitutional promise of equal protection
of the laws applies to aliens as well as citizens.”244 But the court did
acknowledge that “the right of a permanent resident alien to re
main in this country has never been held to be the type of ‘funda
mental right’ which would subject classifications touching on it to
strict judicial scrutiny.”245 Though the court then countered with
the statement that the Supreme Court has found deportation to be
equivalent to exile,246 the analogy is not enough to change the treat
ment of deportation from administrative to criminal. Factors like
the plenary power doctrine, the process of administrative law, and
the interests sought to be protected in relief from deportation cases
all play a role in forming a lesser scrutinized version of equal pro
242. See, e.g., Campos, 961 F.2d at 315.
243. Leal-Rodriguez v. INS, 990 F.2d 939, 952 (7th Cir. 1993).
244. Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268, 272 (2d Cir. 1976) (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356, 368-69 (1886)); see Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982) (“Aliens, even
aliens whose presence in this country is unlawful, have long been recognized as ‘per
sons’ guaranteed due process of law by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.”);
Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953) (stating that depor
tation can only occur after completion of immigration proceedings that satisfy due pro
cess standards).
245. Francis, 532 F.2d at 272.
246. Id.
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tection rights.247 This larger question of how much equal protection
is guaranteed to LPRs leaves many section 212(c) cases, including
Blake v. Carbone, up for debate.
C. Offense-Specific Approach Creates Further Confusion
Many petitioners, like those in Blake, make the argument that,
although they are subject to deportation for a specific aggravatedfelony conviction with no facially comparable exclusion provision,
they are eligible for 212(c) relief because the crime committed
amounts to a CIMT ground for exclusion.248 In Blake, the Second
Circuit held that each petitioner was eligible for relief if, on re
mand, the lower court found that the “particular aggravated felony
offense could form the basis of exclusion under [section] 212(a) as a
crime of moral turpitude.”249 Two major points of confusion result
from this holding: how the aggravated felony offense should be
compared to the definition of a CIMT250 and whether the approach
already taken by some courts of appeals in removing LPRs based
on CIMTs is appropriate.
The term “moral turpitude” first appeared in immigration laws
in the late nineteenth century, where exclusion was directed toward
“persons who have been convicted of a felony or other infamous
crime or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude.”251 From then on
the CIMT language has been part of immigration laws and subject
to much controversy.252 To be sure, Congress has not defined
247. For a related discussion on the liberty and property interests of a petitioner
in deportation hearings, see Brief of Respondent at 28-30, Zamora-Mallari v. Mukasey,
514 F.3d 679 (7th Cir. 2008) (No. 06-3717). The government argued that because he did
not have a liberty or property interest in the outcome of the proceedings because it was
purely discretionary, he could not make out an equal protection claim. Id. at 29.
248. Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88, 100 (2d Cir. 2007) (noting petitioners’ argu
ment that all aggravated felony grounds of deportation are categorically CIMTs, or in
the alternative, that each aggravated felony could form the basis of a CIMT ground of
exclusion); see Zamora-Mallari, 514 F.3d at 692; Kim v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 58, 62 (1st
Cir. 2006).
249. Blake, 489 F.3d at 104 (emphasis added).
250. One author suggests that the statutory-counterpart rule gives the DHS too
much power and that the holding in Blake v. Carbone, which allows for some specula
tion, mitigates this disparity. See Barr, supra note 117, at 755-56. However, this suggestion fails to consider the practical ramifications of allowing petitioners to argue that
counterparts exist in CIMT and crimes of violence.
251. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084.
252. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 82-1137, at 9-10, 21-22 (1952); H.R. REP. NO. 82-1365,
at 13, 15, 48, 50, 60, 131, 132, 176 (1952); S. REP. NO. 64-352, at 1 (1916). See generally
Derrick Moore, Note, “Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude”: Why the Void-for-Vague
ness Argument Is Still Available and Meritorious, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 813 (2008); Jay
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“moral turpitude” in the INA. Mei v. Ashcroft defined moral turpi
tude “as an act which is per se morally reprehensible and intrinsi
cally wrong, or malum in se, so it is the nature of the act itself and
not the statutory prohibition of it which renders a crime one of
moral turpitude.”253 Another popular definition includes “conduct
that shocks the public conscience as being inherently base, vile, or
depraved, and contrary to the accepted rules of morality and the
duties owed between person or to society in general.”254
These are not, however, the only possible definitions.255 Some
argue that the term itself is redundant and therefore lacks clarity.256
And, as one court stated, “[t]he phrase ‘moral turpitude’ is one of
the most ambiguous in the long list of ambiguous legal phrases, and
the cases are far from consistent.”257 Additionally, with respect to
relief from deportation, courts have held that the determination of
“whether a crime involves . . . moral turpitude depends upon the
inherent nature of the offense, as defined in the relevant statute,
rather than the circumstances surrounding [the petitioner’s] partic
ular conduct.”258
Presently, immigration law excludes noncitizens who have
been convicted of a CIMT or who admit to having committed a
CIMT or acts that constitute the essential elements of such a
Wilson, Comment, The Definitional Problems with “Moral Turpitude,” 16 J. LEGAL
PROF. 261 (1991) (examining the problems that arise when one tries to distinguish
crimes that involve moral turpitude from crimes that do not in the context of the legal
profession).
253. Mei v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 737, 739 (7th Cir. 2004) (quoting In re Ajami, 22 I.
& N. Dec. 949, 950 (B.I.A. 1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
254. See, e.g., Hamdan v. INS, 98 F.3d 183, 186 (5th Cir. 1996); Medina v. United
States, 259 F.3d 220, 227 (4th Cir. 2001).
255. See, e.g., Guerrero de Nodahl v. INS, 407 F.2d 1405, 1406 (9th Cir. 1969)
(affirming that an act of moral turpitude is one that is “intrinsically wrong”); United
States ex rel. Berlandi v. Reimer, 30 F. Supp. 767, 768 (S.D.N.Y 1939) (stating that
moral turpitude is an “indefinite term” but includes “[e]verthing done contrary to jus
tice, honesty, or good morals” (citation and internal quotations marks omitted)), aff’d,
113 F.2d 429 (2d Cir. 1940); United States v. Carrollo, 30 F. Supp. 3, 6 (W.D. Mo. 1939)
(defining an act of moral turpitude as one that “grievously offends the moral code of
mankind and would do so even in the absence of a prohibitive statute”).
256. Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 232-45 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
In his dissent, Justice Jackson questioned how well courts could define what type of
conduct is a CIMT without an “intelligible definition of deportable conduct.” Id. at
245. The Jordan majority, however, held that the term was not unconstitutionally
vague. Id. at 232 (majority opinion).
257. Kim v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 58, 62 (1st Cir. 2006).
258. Itani v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 1213, 1215-16 (11th Cir. 2002); see, e.g., SosaMartinez v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 420 F.3d 1338, 1341-42 (11th Cir. 2005); Ramirez v.
Ashcroft, 361 F. Supp. 2d 650, 657-58 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
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crime.259 In Gill v. INS, the Second Circuit afforded Chevron def
erence to the BIA’s construction of the “undefined” phrase “moral
turpitude.”260 There, the court reviewed the BIA’s interpretation
of federal and state criminal statutes with respect to the BIA’s con
clusion that recklessness, in combination with serious resulting bod
ily injury and use of a deadly weapon, amounted to a CIMT.261 The
court reviewed the BIA’s decision for the purposes of removal, not
section 212(c) relief.262 The court stated, “In assessing whether a
crime of conviction is a CIMT, the BIA takes the ‘categorical ap
proach,’ focusing on ‘the intrinsic nature of the offense.’”263 The
court went on to state that the proper focus is on intent, the
“mental state reflected in a given offense.”264 Upon a short
description of BIA precedent where crimes committed knowingly
or intentionally were found to be CIMTs, the court affirmed the
BIA’s determination that “attempted reckless assault” under New
York law contained the elements of a CIMT.265
Gill illustrates the complicated analysis required to determine
whether an offense is a CIMT. Moreover, in Blake, the Second Cir
cuit stated that a CIMT determination relative to an aggravated fel
ony “is one well within the BIA’s expertise” and cited Gill.266
Given the extensive line of reasoning used in Gill and the number
of aggravated felony grounds of deportation as well as the impot of
federal and state law, CIMT analysis does not appear to be quick
and manageable. Plus, when one considers the undefined term of
moral turpitude, the numerous definitions from which a court could
choose, and the evolving morals of the public, a CIMT determina
tion cannot be objective. In fact, such a determination will be ripe
for appeal based on inconsistency, arbitrariness, and subjectivity.267
Section 212(c) jurisprudence does not need another layer of compli
cation, which, as evidenced above, is a likely result when applying
the offense-specific approach.
259. INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i) (2006).
260. Gill v. INS, 420 F.3d 82, 89 (2d Cir. 2005). The court went so far as to say
that “the BIA has expertise applying and construing immigration law.” Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. (quoting Dalton v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 200, 204 (2d Cir. 2001)).
264. Id.
265. Id. at 89-90.
266. Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88, 104 (2d Cir. 2007).
267. This hypothetical framework that the offense could form the basis of a
CIMT invites subjective interpretation. Since it is not definitive, it is possible that many
offenses would fall under the framework. It is a vague and broad test that is far from
the narrow statutory interpretation of the comparable-grounds approach.
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Ironically, the Second Circuit is wary of such arbitrary analysis.
It strongly opposed judicial arbitrariness in its critique of the BIA’s
rationale in In re Blake.268 Specifically, the court had concerns with
the BIA’s standard that an “incidental overlap” between grounds
does not reach the level of a statutory counterpart.269 The Second
Circuit stated that such a standard “invites arbitrary decision mak
ing” because there is no certainty as to what amount of overlap is
enough.270 In a CIMT analysis, this same type of vagueness and
arbitrary decision making will occur. Thus, the offense-specific ap
proach will create problems that the Second Circuit has sought to
avoid. Because this standard is based on moral, rather than legal,
standards, and moral standards change over time and vary in differ
ent locations,271 it is not possible for the CIMT analysis, per the
offense-specific approach, to be consistent as applied.
D. Comparable Grounds Provides Uniformity and Congruency
The comparable-grounds approach is preferred for two main
reasons. One, it promotes uniformity through both its wide accept
ance in the federal and immigration courts and its significant prece
dential value. Two, given the unique equal protection framework of
the section 212(c) eligibility determination, the comparison be
tween grounds makes sense analytically.
1. Benefits of Uniformity
The federal courts favor uniformity and consistency to support
the structure and function of the court system.272 “Not only is uni
form interpretation of federal law assumed to be desirable as a mat
ter of policy, some judges and scholars claim that the Constitution
requires federal courts to standardize the meaning of federal law
for the nation.”273 Though Blake v. Carbone is not binding on the
other federal circuits, it nonetheless defeats uniformity in the fed
eral court system and in immigration law, which in turn creates in
consistent results, uncertainty among petitioners, and the impetus
268. Blake, 489 F.3d at 102 n.10.
269. Id. at 102 & n.10.
270. Id. at 102 n.10.
271. See United States ex rel. Berlandi v. Reimer, 113 F.2d 429 (2d Cir. 1939);
United States ex rel. Manzella v. Zimmerman, 71 F. Supp. 534 (D. Pa. 1947).
272. See Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567, 1569
(2008). Though this article questions the weight given to uniformity, it nonetheless es
tablishes that uniformity is currently a desirable goal. Id. at 1574.
273. Id. at 1569.
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to forum shop.274 By keeping the equal protection analysis the
same within each federal circuit, legal uncertainty is thwarted while
consistency in the law is promoted. Without a common method to
determine whether the deportee is similarly situated to an excludee,
there is no way to ensure consistent results. Even though there is
no explicit requirement for uniformity in immigration law, policy
reasons suggest it is preferable.
Furthermore, one of the constitutional bases for the federal
government’s power to regulate immigration requires uniformity in
the related area of naturalization.275 It can be argued that this
should extend to other areas of immigration law. In fact, some
courts have stated that uniform immigration law is of “paramount”
importance since immigration is exclusively a federal responsibil
ity.276 Similarly, courts have reasoned that uniformity is important
in the nationwide application of immigration law.277 Because the
vast majority of courts of appeals follow the BIA’s comparablegrounds approach,278 in the interest of uniformity alone, this ap
proach is the preferable choice. Simply, the Second Circuit’s deci
sion to create its own test impedes the goals of uniformity stated
earlier.
Additionally, the comparable-grounds approach stems from
over thirty years of BIA precedent, including an affirmative opinion
by the Attorney General.279 It has been upheld by the majority of
courts of appeals and is now codified in federal regulation. Though
the approach may have initially been an attempt to synthesize
“problematic legislation” with “judicial-stitchery,” its long-standing
presence in immigration jurisprudence is undeniable.280 In answer
274. See generally Iris Bennett, Note, The Unconstitutionality of Nonuniform Im
migration Consequences of “Aggravated Felony” Convictions, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1696,
1700 (1999) (discussing how immigration case law has extended the uniformity require
ment found in the Naturalization Clause to other aspects of immigration law and thus
should be extended to the aggravated felony provision).
275. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
276. See, e.g., Ferreira v. Ashcroft, 382 F.3d 1045, 1050 (9th Cir. 2004)
(“[I]mmigration laws should be applied uniformly across the country.” (quoting
Cazarez-Gutierrez v. Ashcroft, 382 F.3d 905, 913 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
277. See, e.g., Drakes v. Zimski, 240 F.3d 246, 248 (3d Cir. 2001).
278. See supra note 163.
279. See In re Hernandez-Casillas, 20 I. & N. Dec. 262, 264-65 (B.I.A. 1990) (re
viewing history), disapproved by 20 I. & N. Dec. 280 (Att’y Gen. 1991), aff’d sub nom.
983 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1993) (unpublished table opinion).
280. Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88, 105 (2d Cir. 2007).
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ing which of the two approaches is preferred, decades of precedent
cannot be ignored.
2. Textual Focus of the Comparable-Grounds Approach
The comparable-grounds approach also provides a logical
framework for courts to follow. The analysis of the language in
both the exclusionary and deportation provisions is critical since a
“textual link between [a deportation and an exclusion provision]
indicate[s] that Congress had the same class of offenses in mind
when it enacted the two provisions that must be compared.”281 A
“common-sense understanding” of the crimes involved in each pro
vision does not provide this type of insight.282
To be similarly situated there must be an evident textual link to
satisfy the equal protection concerns of Francis and Silva.283 The
comparable-grounds approach itself is uncomplicated so long as the
longstanding case law is understood. The inclination to complicate
the question of “whether Congress has employed similar language
to describe substantially equivalent categories of offenses” is under
standable, particularly when the deportation ground is an aggra
vated felony.284 However, to do so is to cause a problem where one
need not be.
Rather, the focus on similar language in the comparablegrounds approach is a rational standard.285 While the Second Cir
cuit found that “[t]he BIA’s emphasis on similar language is
281. Avilez-Granados v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 869, 872 (5th Cir. 2007).
282. See id.
283. See Valere v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 757, 762 (7th Cir. 2007). The Seventh Cir
cuit explained,
[T]he requirement of a comparable ground of exclusion in [section] 212(a)—a
“statutory counterpart”—is what makes a removable, nondeparting alien simi
larly situated to an inadmissible alien in the first place. If the removable
alien’s crime of conviction is not substantially equivalent to a ground of inad
missibility under [section] 212(a), then the removable alien is not similarly sit
uated for purposes of claiming an equal protection right to apply for [section]
212(c) relief.
Id.
284. In re Blake, 23 I. & N. Dec. 722, 728 (B.I.A. 2005), vacated sub nom. Blake
v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88.
285. Cf. Barr, supra note 117, at 757-60 (arguing that the comparable-grounds
approach creates arbitrary distinctions at various stages of a petitioner’s eligibility
claim). For additional insight on the comparable-grounds versus offense-specific ap
proach debate, see Michael M. Waits, Note, “In Like Circumstances, but for Irrelevant
and Fortuitous Factors”: The Availability of Section 212(c) Relief to Deportable Legal
Permanent Residents, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 465 (2009).
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strange,”286 this concern only arises in rare situations involving a
potential overlap like in Jimenez-Santillano v. INS, where an exclu
sionary provision is written broadly and seemingly encompasses a
ground of deportation.287 But, to automatically assume there is a
counterpart is incorrect. The comparable-grounds approach prop
erly guides courts in finding the necessary textual link between the
statutes. This approach ensures that the intent existed for the two
grounds to be compared, instead of a judicial reclassification of of
fenses based on factual similarities.
CONCLUSION
Because a circuit split does exist, there is room for either the
legislative or judicial branch to decide the issue. Generally, the Su
preme Court resolves such matters. However, here, congressional
action is the appropriate option. Plenary power authorizes Con
gress’s control over immigration matters. As the legislative body
that speaks for the people of the United States, Congress translates
society’s views into law. If courts “tinker” with the current system
for 212(c) eligibility, they are sparring with congressional intent and
potentially overstepping judicial bounds.288 For these reasons it is
that body, not the Supreme Court, that must change immigration
statutes to better serve both citizen and noncitizen residents of the
United States.
Currently, the United States’s policy toward immigration is
one of heightened protection for its citizens. Until the country can
resolve its own conflicting views toward immigration, the laws will
stay the same. The courts then must uphold the statutes and the

286. Blake, 489 F.3d at 102.
287. See Jimenez-Santillano v. INS, 120 F.3d 270, No. 96-9532, 1997 WL 447315,
at *1-3 (10th Cir. July 28, 1997) (unpublished table decision). The Tenth Circuit af
firmed the BIA’s finding of no statutory counterpart. Id. at *2.
288. Campos v. INS, 961 F.2d 309, 317 (1st Cir. 1992). Additionally, “judicial
redrafting would serve only to pull the statute further from its moorings in the legisla
tive will.” Zamora-Mallari v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 679, 692 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Far
quharson v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 246 F.3d 1317, 1325 (11th Cir. 2001)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Courts are in agreement that “a statute of this detailed na
ture is best left to the ministrations of the Congress.” Leal-Rodriguez v. INS, 990 F.2d
939, 952 (7th Cir. 1993) (quoting Campos, 961 F.2d at 316-17) (internal quotation marks
omitted); cf. Barr, supra note 117, at 755 (stating that both rationales of reliance and
fear are not “valid because Congress never contemplated this issue” of section 212(c)
relief for deportation).
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policies that underlie them. If the people decide that change is nec
essary, it must come from Congress, not the bench.289
Despite the convoluted history of section 212(c), one approach
for determining eligibility has remained at the forefront of all sec
tion 212(c) relief matters. To choose otherwise is to choose more
confusion. The majority of courts of appeals uphold the statutorycounterpart approach, which is testimony to its effectiveness.
Though some might argue that the rule is form over substance,
form is indeed one of its strong points.290 By applying the same
standard across the country, noncitizens in deportation hearings
know that they are receiving the same universal treatment. The
Second Circuit’s offense-specific approach will only add more con
fusion to the story of section 212(c). Moreover, the Second Cir
cuit’s reliance on the equal protection rights afforded in Francis is
faulty, allowing for an inappropriate focus on the facts of the peti
tioner’s offense.
With the likelihood of many CIMT claims under this approach,
the courts will be bogged down with highly arbitrary, subjective
analysis. The need for a more accurate approach that analyzes con
sistent statutory language versus inconsistent factual matters will
quickly materialize. Furthermore, the offense-specific approach
creates a loophole for those who have committed a more serious
crime to be eligible for relief while those with less severe infractions
will be barred. The vagueness of the CIMT ground of exclusion
(and the crime-of-violence ground of deportation) provides more
room for argument for those who have committed serious crimes
than those with a lesser degree of seriousness. Given all of these
concerns, the comparable-grounds approach is the correct analysis
in determining eligibility for section 212(c) relief.
Sara Fawk*

289. See Campos, 961 F.2d at 316 (“[T]he conditions of entry for every alien, . . .
the right to terminate hospitality to aliens, the grounds on which such determination
shall be based, have been recognized as matters solely for the responsibility of Congress
and wholly outside the power of this Court to control.” (alterations in original) (quoting
Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 796 (1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
290. See Barr, supra note 117, at 760.
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